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One of the contentious issues in electricity reform is whether there are significant gains 
from restructuring systems that are moderately well-run.  South Africa’s electricity 
system is a case in point. The sector’s state-owned utility, Eskom, has been generating 
some of the lowest-priced electricity in the world, has largely achieved revenue 
adequacy, and has financed the bulk of the government’s ambitious electrification 
program.  Moreover, the key technical performance indicators of Eskom’s generation 
plants have reached world-class levels.  Yet the sector is confronted today with serious 
challenges.  South Africa’s electricity system is currently facing a very tight 
demand/supply balance, and the distribution segment of the industry is in serious 
financial trouble.  This paper provides a careful diagnostic assessment of the industry and 
identifies a range of policy and restructuring options to improve its performance.  It 
suggests removing distribution from municipal control and privatizing it, calls for vertical 
and horizontal unbundling, and argues that the cost-benefit analysis of different structural 
options should focus on investment incentives and not just current operating efficiency.    
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“Electricity supply throughout the world is undergoing a revolution. This is being caused mainly, but not 
solely, by electricity utilities having to meet new pressures resulting from global markets and governments 
opening up their countries to foreign investors to help fund power sector expansion and development. As a 
result, utilities are having to see themselves as businesses, and act accordingly. South Africa is not immune 
from these forces, and will have to move broadly in line with developments taking place in the rest of the 
world, while also ensuring that the industry evolution meets South Africa’s special requirements. However, 
in South Africa the main drivers for change are potential economic efficiency gains, and technological 
change (e.g. different economies of scale in power plant construction and new information and control 
technologies).” 
 Source:  White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa, 1998.
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I.  Introduction and Preliminary Observations 
 
The primary objective of this report is to examine the structure of the South African 
electricity supply industry and to analyze public policies designed to improve its 
performance.  Our focus on the electricity industry is motivated by its critical role for 
sustained economic growth, poverty alleviation, and international competitiveness.  South 
Africa’s electricity sector has played a particularly important role in the country’s 
industrialization and economic development.  The origins of the sector at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, for example, were driven primarily by the requirements of the 
booming mining industry.
2  With its abundance of coal reserves, South Africa has a 
distinct comparative advantage in energy supply that has contributed to growth 
opportunities for the economy as a whole.  Indeed, low-priced electricity generated from 
coal-fired stations has been one of the country’s key competitive advantages. 
 
  The sector’s main operating entity, Eskom, appears to be an efficient and well-
functioning utility even when judged by advanced industrial country standards.  Eskom 
has: (i) been generating some of the lowest-priced electricity in the world (in 2005, for 
example, the average electricity tariffs in South Africa for both domestic and industrial 
customers were the lowest among the countries surveyed by the International Energy 
Agency); (ii) managed to meet and in some years actually exceed the government’s 
ambitious electrification targets with significant cost reducing innovations—within a 
decade (starting in the early 1990s), the number of domestic electricity customers more 
than doubled making South Africa’s recorded electrification rates the highest in world 
while at the same time dramatic reductions in the capital investment costs of rural 
connections were achieved through careful network planning and significant 
technological innovation (between 1995 and 2001, the average cost of rural electrification 
declined by 40 percent in real terms); and (iii) at the same time, the utility exhibited 
robust financial and operational performance—during the past twenty years Eskom has 
earned between 8 and 12 percent pre-tax rate of return on its assets, its debt/equity ratio 
declined from 2.06 in 1980, 1.6 in 1995, 0.3 in 2003, and to a record low of 0.18 in 2005, 
while during most of the same period the utility reduced its prices in real terms (since the 
late 1980s, Eskom’s average tariff increases have been consistently below inflation until 
                                                 
1 http://www.dme.gov.za/publications/wp_ene/whitepaper1998.htm 
2 Spalding-Fecher, R. 2002. “Energy and Energy Policies in South Africa: An Overview”. NER Quarterly 
Journal 1: 1-18.    6
Ineffective cost recovery and chaotic 
billing systems at the municipal level 
are serious economic and political 
issues in South Africa.  There are 
strong implications for future 
municipal viability, civic compliance 
more broadly, as well as the 
prospects for poverty alleviation and 
private sector participation with 
municipalities.
The continuing uncertainty 
regarding the status of the 
distribution industry is likely 
to exacerbate the problems of 
inadequate investment and 
deterioration of system 
reliability. 
2003 when the trend was reversed).  In fact, Eskom has been entirely self-financed 
through internal reserves and debt raised on the domestic and international capital 
markets without explicit government guarantees.  Thus, unlike most other state-owned 
utilities, it has not been draining the state budget nor has it caused diversion of scarce 
public resources from other social purposes.  Finally, as a result of an number of supply-
side management initiatives during the 1990s, Eskom’s generation plant performance 
improved substantially and by early part of this decade several of its technical 
performance metrics (e.g. Unit Capability Factor, Unplanned Capability Loss Factor, and 
Unplanned Automatic Grid Separations per 7000 operating hours) had reached world-
class levels (in some instances well above the international best quartile). 
 
Thus, there is much to applaud to applaud in South Africa’s electricity sector.  Since 
the end of apartheid, it has been operating in a manner that reflects genuine commitment 
to the public interest.  However, even within such a well-run electricity system several 
problems have emerged which, if not adequately addressed, could seriously undermine its 
future performance. 
 
First, while the generation and 
transmission segments of the industry 
(under the control of Eskom) have been 
operating efficiently, the distribution 
segment (mostly under the control of the 
municipalities) has been marred by serious 
structural inefficiencies and has been in 
serious financial trouble for a number of 
years now.  One of the key structural 
deficiencies of the electricity distribution 
industry (EDI) has been excessive 
fragmentation--there were (and still are) too 
many, poorly-run and non-viable municipal distributors suffering from severe debt 
problems, high-levels of non-payment for services, insufficient asset management, and 
lack of appropriate technical resources.
3  After several years of studies and consultations, 
the Cabinet approved in June 1999 a plan to merge the large number (over 380) of 
municipal distributors and Eskom’s distribution businesses into six Regional Distribution 
Companies (REDs).  The Cabinet’s decision to rationalize South Africa’s electricity 
distribution industry represented a significant policy 
response to an urgent national imperative.  And it 
held the promise of remedying the unfavorable 
microeconomic conditions and poor governance 
that were largely responsible for the poor 
performance of the EDI under its previous, highly 
fragmented structural configuration.  However, 
implementation of the Cabinet’s decision has been 
                                                 
3 Balgobind, P. 2003. “National Summit on Maintenance of Electricity Distribution Networks:  Speeches 
by the Minister of Minerals and Energy, Ms Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and the CEO of the NER, Dr X. H. 
Mkhwanazi”.  NER Quarterly Journal 2: 3-8.   7
In the face of the substantial new 
investment that will be required in 
South Africa’s electricity sector in 
the next few years, the cost-benefit 
analysis of different structural and 
other policy options should focus on 
investment incentives and not just on 
current operational efficiency. 
Increasing power shortages in South 
Africa could pose a serious threat to 
sustained economic growth and 
international competitiveness. 
painfully slow and convoluted.  The first RED was established only in 2005 and only on 
paper.  Moreover, recent draft Cabinet memos and interventions by National Treasury 
officials have created some uncertainty and confusion about the consolidation model that 
will ultimately be implemented. In any case, it is far from clear that the South African 
municipalities should be in the business of operating and owning technically-complex 
and capital intensive local electricity networks, whose efficient functioning requires 
proper and continuous maintenance supported by financial discipline, revenue adequacy, 
and technical expertise.  All restructuring and related reform efforts in the electricity 
supply industry will not amount to much unless they address the revenue adequacy issue 
at the distribution end.  The merger and consolidation of municipal distributors might not 
adequately address the municipalities’ governance and nonpayment problems, and 
especially their traditional dependence on electricity revenue to fund other services 
(which diverted resources away from critical maintenance of distribution assets). 
       
Second, after having been stranded 
with surplus capacity for over two decades 
(due to overinvestment from the late 
1970s to the early 1990s), today South 
Africa’s electricity system is confronted 
with a very tight demand/supply balance 
and thus its adequacy and reliability are in jeopardy.  This is evidenced by the alarming 
decline in the system’s reserve margin (to just 8.5 percent in 2004) and the recent 
blackouts in several areas of the country.
4  For the electricity system to meet the demands 
of South Africa’s expanding and modernized economy, and to further reduce the 
country’s power divide (a dark shadow cast by the long history of apartheid), it will 
require substantial new investment especially in generation but also in transmission and 
distribution.  Thus, investment decisions need to be urgently made with respect to new 
generating capacity that will entail critical 
choices among alternate electricity 
generation technologies.  These decisions 
will have profound macroeconomic, 
security, and environmental implications.   
The emerging international experience 
raises some doubts as to whether the 
vertically-integrated, state-owned monopoly 
is the most appropriate market structure for 
making economically efficient new 
generation and other investment decisions—
both with respect to size and also the choice of technology.  It is increasingly argued that 
with workable markets, private market participants investing their own funds might be 
better overall in balancing risks and rewards than would central planners.  The 
applicability, if any, of this international experience to the unique circumstances of South 
Africa needs to be carefully assessed.  The poor investment decisions by Eskom during 
the 1980s make a most compelling case for such reassessment. 
                                                 
4 A well-run electricity system should have a reserve margin of about 15 percent to allow for planned 
maintenance and unplanned shut-downs.   8
In view of the socioeconomic characteristics of 
South Africa’s electricity users, radical, across-
the-board tariff rebalancing schemes can 
seriously conflict with social fairness.  Meanwhile, 
to facilitate the needed capacity expansion, the 
electricity system must meet certain revenue 
adequacy criteria.  Thus, policymakers  in South 
Africa are confronted with a difficult and 
apparently irreconcilable dilemma: their own 
understandable predilections, supplemented by 
powerful political pressures, have motivated them 
to encourage low prices that will increasingly 
become incompatible with any rational capacity 
expansion program to address the country’s 
growing power shortages. 
 
Third, the new Electricity Regulation Bill that was introduced into Parliament in 
August 2005 could undermine the coherence and independence of the sector’s regulatory 
structure.  Chapter IV of the Bill, if enacted, will take away the statutory authority to 
regulate prices from the National Energy Regulator (NER) and place it in the hands of the 
municipalities which would exercise that authority under the guidance of the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy.
5  Regulatory responsibilities that must be coherently and delicately 
harmonized should be kept within a single agency and not be counterproductively 
splintered.  The Bill’s proposed demarcation of responsibilities between the Ministry of 
Minerals and Energy, the municipalities, and NER (which would be charged with 
monitoring and regulating the performance and compliance of the municipalities to the 
requirements of the Act), is confusing and will likely undermine regulatory clarity—the 
provisions for NER’s monitoring function are too complex.  Moreover, to ensure 
regulatory stability, an indispensable precondition for attracting private investment, it is 
imperative to mitigate political intrusion on the sector’s tariff policies.  In the face of the 
sector’s substantial requirements for new generating capacity, any rational tariff policy 
will have to be increasingly be based on forward looking economic costs—i.e. the 
reliance on historical book values of generating and other assets which facilitated the low 
prices of the last two decades will inevitably to come to end.  Thus, the realignment of 
prices with underlying long-term costs (that are based on forward looking incremental 
costs and not just historical book values) is rapidly becoming necessary—both for the 
financial viability of the sector and for the public interest.   Effective regulation requires 
independence of the regulators from political influences--the posture of the regulatory 
agency must be one of an impartial, objective, non-political enforcer of policies set forth 
in the controlling statutes, free of transitory political influences.  Thus, the proposed role 
of the Ministry of Minerals and 
Energy in the regulatory arena 
will inevitably increase 
regulatory risk, especially as 
perceived by potential private 
investors. And the combination 
of regulatory and operational 
functions on the part of the 
municipalities will clearly 
conflict with the creation of a 
“level playing field” in the 
sector.  Also, some of the 
municipalities might lack the 
technical expertise to carry out 
their regulatory functions.   
Thus the Bill’s proposed 
statutory framework will lead to capacity problems.  
 
                                                 
5 The Bill recently passed both houses of Parliament but without its controversial Chapter IV which defines 
the powers and duties of the municipalities.  The omission of Chapter IV was mainly due to procedural 
issues.  The Government is currently preparing an amendment to the Bill to deal with this issue.   9
Fourth, the extent of Eskom’s vertical and horizontal market dominance is at variance 
with international policy developments in the electricity sector and is a primary 
impediment to the future competitive developments in the sector.  Historically the 
electricity industry has had a monolithic structure, with a single entity owning generation 
and transmission capacity and performing all system operations and administrative 
functions.  However, due to technological and other fundamental economic changes, the 
conditions that generated this model no longer exist in most countries.  Thus, especially 
over the past decade, views have changed dramatically on how electricity should be 
owned, organized, and regulated.
6 
 
Eskom as an integrated utility will have strong incentives and ability to make it very 
difficult for other entities to participate in South Africa’s electricity business.  Private 
entities will simply be reluctant to enter into the electricity industry and make substantial 
sunk investments if the industry’s essential facilities are controlled by Eskom—a   
competitor in the downstream provision of electricity services to final users.  Also, 
Eskom’s continued vertical and horizontal market dominance may inhibit the effective 
integration of electricity markets in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).  Integration of electricity markets can yield significant benefits to South Africa 
by exploiting complementarities in primary energy endowments and giving access to 
lower-cost regional supplies, reducing supply risks through the provision of multiple 
links between system loads and cross-country generating resources, and sharing 
generation reserve margins among several utilities or countries.  The other countries of 
the region may consider Eskom’s large size as posing too serious of a threat to the 
survival of their smaller national utilities.  Thus, integration may be viewed as likely to 
facilitate Eskom’s dominance and monopolization of the entire regional electricity 
market.  Moreover, as a vertically-integrated utility, Eskom will generally have strong 
incentives for self-dealing and self-preference (e.g. for its own generating stations) and 
thus could hinder the interchange of power in the region and the extent of cross-border 
competition that could emerge. 










                                                 
6 Newbery, D. 2001.  “Issues and Options for Restructuring the ESI”.  University of Cambridge, 
Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge, U.K.   10
II.  The Structure of the Electricity Industry in South 
Africa 
 
The electricity industry of South Africa is dominated by the state-owned, vertically- 
integrated utility, Eskom, an energy giant even by international standards.  It accounts for 
over 50 percent of the electricity generated in the entire African continent.  In 2005, it 
ranked: 11
th in the world in terms of installed generating capacity—39,810 MW just 
below Spain’s Endesa (43,000 MW) and Brazil’s Electrobras (40, 854 MW); and 7
th in 
terms of generating sales—207 TWh, after Japan’s TEPCO (281 TWh) and Germany’s 
RWE (230 TWh).
7  Eskom’s Kendal generating unit has installed capacity of over 4 GW 
making it the largest coal-fired station in the world. 
 
Figure 1  Energy flows in the electricity industry of  South Africa: 2004 
 
 
  Source: National Electricity Regulator (2004). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the extent of Eskom’s horizontal and vertical market dominance.  
It enjoys a near monopoly in both generation and transmission accounting for 
approximately 96 percent of South Africa’s total installed generating capacity and 96 
percent of generated electricity.  It also controls virtually 100 percent of the system’s 
transmission assets.  And while in distribution Eskom’s dominance is less pronounced, it 
still supplies about 60 percent of electricity to final customers with the remainder 42 
percent of supply provided by 187 local authorities.
8, 
9   These local authorities buy the 
majority of their power in bulk from Eskom while a few of them are also generating 
                                                 
7  Eskom Annual Report 2005. 
8 National Electricity Regulator (2004).  Electricity Supply Statistics for South Africa. Pretoria. 
9 Eberhard, A. (2004). “The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform in South Africa”.  Working Paper 













small amounts of electricity in their respective areas of jurisdiction.  A few large 
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South Africa is blessed by abundant coal.  The country has the world’s seventh 
largest recoverable coal reserves--approximately 55 billion short tons, about 5 percent of 
the world total.
10  It is the world’s sixth largest coal producer—245.3 million short tons  
(mmst) in 2002.  Out of the 171.6 mmst of coal consumed in 2002, 90 percent was used 
for electricity generation and the production of synthetic fuels.
11  South Africa, on the 
other hand, does not have natural gas fields.  As a result, the profile of energy sources 
used in South Africa for the generation of electricity looks quite different from that of the 
rest of the world (figures 2 and 3).  The bulk of South Africa’s electricity is generated 
from coal fired stations which in 2003 accounted for 92 percent of the gross energy sent 
out (202.5 TWh out of a total of 219.2 TWh—figure 2).  During the same year, nuclear 
power accounted for 6 percent (12.7 TWh), with bagasse, hydro and pumped storage 
making up the remaining 2 percent (4 TWh).
12  Gas turbines made a negligible 
contribution.
13  In the rest of the world, during 2002, coal accounted for 37 percent and 
natural gas for 22 percent of electricity generation.  
 
Eskom is by far the largest domestic consumer of coal.  In 1994, the power utility 
used 110 mmst out of the total of 242.8 mmst produced by the South African mines.  By 
2009, it is expected that South Africa will burn between 120 mmst and 130 mmst a year 
                                                 
10 In recent years, the reliability of this figure has been questioned.  In 2004, the DME initiated a study to 
assess the country’s true reserves.  Energy Research Centre (University of Cape Town). 2004. Energy for 
Sustainable Development: South African Profile.  Phase 1 final report.     
11 Energy Information Administration (2005).  Country Analysis Briefs: South Africa 
(www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/safrica.html). 
12 National Electricity Regulator (2003).  Electricity Supply Statistics for South Africa. Pretoria. 
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for electricity generation.  Eskom’s power stations were designed to burn low-grade coal 
which in 2004 was priced at R55 per ton as compared to the higher grade exported coal 
whose price varied between R200 and R400 per ton during the same year.
14   While this 
reliance on low-quality coal enhanced South Africa’s export potential--in 2002, South 
Africa was the world’s third largest net coal exporter (73.7 mmst)--it also created serious 
environmental challenges.  As a result, in recent years Eskom has sought to diversify into 
other forms of energy and renewable energy resources.  Still, the biggest portion of its 
plant mix consists of coal fired base load power stations)—11 operational stations with a 
total capacity of 32,066 MW.  Two other coal fired stations—Grootvlei and Komti—with 
a total installed capacity of 2,200 MW have been mothballed, but are now being returned 
to service.  Moreover, the Camden Power Station is in the process of re-commissioning 
two of its production units which would add 1,600 MW of capacity to the system. 
 
Table 1  Eskom’s plant mix 
 











Mothballed coal fired 
stations 
 
Arnot: 2 100MW 
Duvha: 3 600MW 
Hendrina: 2 000MW 
Kendal: 4 116MW 
Kriel: 3 000MW 
Lethabo: 3 708MW 
Majuba: 4 110MW 
Matimba: 3 990MW 
Matla: 3 600MW 
Tutuka: 3 654MW 
Camden: 1 600MW 
Grootvlei: 1 200MW 








Sasolburg, Free State 
Volksrust, Mpumalanga 










Koeberg: 1 840MW 
 
 




stations – Orange River 
 
 
Gariep: 360 MW  
Vanderkloof: 240 MW 
 
Norvalspont, Free State 





Drakensberg: 1000 MW 
Palmiet: 400 MW 
 
  
Bergville, KawZulu Natal 
Grabouw, Western Cape 
 
Gas fired stations 
 
Acacia: 171MW 
Port Rex: 171MW 
 
 
Cape Town, Western Cape 
East London, Eastern Cape 
 
Total  Installed Capacity: 41,860 MW (38,060 MW net) 
  Source: Eskom Generon Communication GFS 0004 (2005). 
 
Eskom operates Africa’s only nuclear power station, Koeberg, with installed capacity 
of 1,840 MW and located near the major load center of Cape Town, at the opposite end 
                                                 
14 Eskom (2005).  Engineering News: 14 June 2005.   13
of the country from the coal reserves of Mpumalanga.
15  Its plant mix also includes (table 
1): two conventional hydroelectric stations, Gariep and Vanderkloof, with a joint capacity 
of 2,000 MW;
16 two pumped storage schemes, Drakensberg and Palmiet, with combined 
capacity of 1,400 MW which play a critical role for meeting peak demand, system 
balancing and control; and two gas turbine stations, Acacia and Palmiet, with total 
capacity of 342 MW (these stations consist of Boeing 707 jet engines that use kerosene as 
their primary fuel). 
 
Eskom exports electricity to Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, and Zambia.  In 2004, approximately 13 TWh (about 6 percent of the total 
produced by Eskom stations) of electricity were exported to neighboring countries while 
9.8 TWh were imported during the same period.
17  In 1998, Eskom signed an agreement 
with the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation which allows South Africa to import 
Zambia’s excess power—300 MW during peak power generation periods.
18 
 
Eskom has been operating an internal pool market for over seven years.  The primary 
objective of the Eskom Power Pool (EPP) was to facilitate optimal dispatch by providing 
a competitive trading platform where prices are determined by the competitive bidding of 
participating generators.
19  However, the extent to which the EPP could lead to a 
competitive market within a vertically integrated monopoly has been clearly limited by 
the fact that all the participating generators are Eskom power stations.  The national 
transmission network is entirely owned by Eskom and comprises of about 27,000 Km of 
high tension (132 to 765 kV) lines the bulk of which (15,200 Km) is at 400 kV.  The 
distribution network consists of approximately 379,000 Km of low voltage lines.  Eskom 
owns 288,000 Km of distribution lines (1 to 132 kV), with the remaining 91,000 Km of 
low voltage lines (mostly below 1 kV) being owned by the municipalities.
20   
 
Until recently, the distribution segment of the industry was highly fragmented.   
Municipalities in South Africa have the constitutional right to supply electricity within 
their local boundaries.  Eskom has legislative rights to supply electricity throughout 
South Africa where municipalities are not supplying.  The municipal segment of the 
distribution sector is characterized by a large variance in size—it includes a small number 
of very large and a large number of very small distributors.  In 1998, more than 120 
municipal distributors supplied electricity to less than 1000 customers and more than 90 
                                                 
15 The Koeberg nuclear power station consists of two units each with a 3-loop Framatome Water 
Pressurized Reactor (PWR) whose condensers are cooled by seawater.  The station boasts the largest 
turbine generators in the Southern Hemishpere and is considered one of the safest of the world’s top-
ranking PWR’s. 
16 South Africa can be classified as a generally dry country, and thus has very little perennial hydropower 
potential. 
17 In 2004, these sales to countries in Southern Africa included: Botswana (1,699 GWh), Mozambique 
(8,076 GWh), Namimbia (1,515 GWh), Zimbabwe (532 GWh), Lesotho (12 GWh), Swaziland (697 GWh), 
Zambia (403 GWh). Eskom Annual Report 2005. 
18 MBendi Information for Africa (2005).  South Africa: Electrical Power. 
19 Van Harmelen G and R. Surtees (2003).  “Internet Based Energy Trading in Southern Africa.” AMEU 
58
th Convention. 
20 National Electricity Regulator (2003).  Electricity Supply Statistics for South Africa. Pretoria.   14
municipalities had electricity revenue of less that R1 million per annum.
21  It is generally 
accepted that electric power distribution is characterized by significant economies of 
scale.  Thus, most of these municipal distributors suffer from substantial average cost 
disadvantages due to their small scale of operation.  Indeed, the 1998 White Paper 
reported that average distribution costs ranged from 23.9 cents per kWh for distributors 
of less than 1 GWh in annual sales to only 13.4 cents per kWh for distributors of more 
than 1000 GWh—a 46 percent average cost differential largely reflecting basic 
economies of scale that were simply lost.
22 
 
The bulk of the electricity in South Africa is consumed by the industrial sector which 
in 2003 accounted for almost 40 percent of total electricity consumption (figure 1).  The 
next two largest consumers, mining and residential, accounted for 17.9 and 17.6 percent 
of total electricity sales ((MWh) respectively and have been showing the greatest growth 
in demand in recent years.  The industrial and mining sectors are even more important for 
Eskom, having accounted in 2003 for over 48 and 30 percent of the utility’s electricity 
sales respectively, while the domestic and commercial customers accounted for just over 
7 and 6 percent of its sales, respectively. 
 
                                                 
21 Davidson and Mwakasonda (2003).  “Southern Africa Sub-regional Study: South Africa and Zimbabwe.”  
Energy & Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town. 
22 http://www.dme.gov.za/publications/wp_ene/whitepaper1998.htm 
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III.  The Performance of the Electricity Industry 
 
Eskom’s performance appears to be highly efficient, especially when judged by 
African standards.  It has been generating some of the lowest priced electricity in the 
world and managed to fulfill the government’s ambitious electrification program while 
maintaining a solid and consistent financial performance.  However, there are some 
questions regarding the efficiency of Eskom’s planning and management of generating 
capacity and overall investment program.
23 
 
Price, Cost, and Financial Performance Trends 
 
Average electricity tariffs in South Africa for both domestic and industrial customers 
are very low by international standards.  In 2005, they were the lowest among the  
 
Figure 4  Average retail electricity prices, 2005 or latest information available 

































Source: IEA (2005). 
 
countries surveyed by the International Energy Agency (figure 4).
 24  In terms of world 
best practice, Eskom has had the lowest observed average price for industrial electricity 
                                                 
23  Eberhard, A. and M. Mtepa.  2003. “Rationale for Restructuring and Regulation of a ‘Low Priced’ 
Public Utility: a Case Study of Eskom in South Africa.”   International Journal of Regulation and 
Governance 3(2): 77-102 
24 International Energy Agency (IEA). 2005. Key World Energy Statistics.  .  A recent World Bank study 
also shows that South African average end-user prices (US cents/kwh) are one of the cheapest in the world 
at 3 cents for residential and 2 cents for non-residential customers. By comparison, these user prices in 
upper middle income countries are, on average, about 9 and 7 cents, respectively, while SSA rates are 6 and   16
for a number of years now.  For example, in 1994 its average price was 5.67 AU cents 
per kWh as compared to other low priced utilities: BC Hydro, Canada (6.04 AU cents); 
South Power, New Zealand (7.19 AU cents); TransAlta, Canada (7.32 AU cents); Duke 
Power, USA (7.77 AU cents); SEAS, Denmark (8.15 AU cents).
25 
 
In contrast to most other state-owned electric utilities, Eskom has been entirely self-
financed through internal reserves and debt raised on the capital markets.  And while it 
has been providing some of the cheapest electricity in the world, Eskom has exhibited 
very robust financial performance.  For most of its recent history the company achieved 
financial viability—revenues have been adequate to cover its pertinent costs including 
operating expenses, capital charges, and a return on equity.
26  In fact, during the past 
twenty years, Eskom has earned between 8 and 12 percent pre-tax rate of return on its 
assets (figure 5).  In 2004/05 the company posted a record net profit and claimed its best  
 
Figure 5  Eskom rate of return on total assets 
     Source: Eskom. 2005.  Annual Report. 
 
financial performance in its 80 years of existence.  Performance was driven by strong 
sales volumes boosted by robust demand from mining companies in the face of high 
commodity prices and buoyant economic growth.  In June 2005, Moody’s upgraded 
Eskom’s domestic currency debt to A1 and foreign currency debt to A2, laying the 
ground for access to cheaper capital to finance its investment program.
27   
                                                                                                                                                 
5 cents. The world average is 9 cents for residential customers and 6 cents for non-residential customers.  
See: Bogetic, Z. and J. Fedderke. 2006. “International Benchmarking of South Africa’s Infrastructure 
Performance”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 3830.  
25 Bureau of Industry Economics. 1995.  International Benchmarking--Overview 1995.  Report 95/20, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. 
26 It is important to note that in determining the revenue requirements for financial viability, the rate of 
return obtained by comparison with other utilities/industries must be applied to a rate base which covers the 
economic replacement cost of all facilities. 
27 Creamer Media’s Engineering News. 2005/06/29.   17
 
The strengthening of Eskom’s balance sheet is further evidenced by its   
debt/equity ratio which declined over the years from 2.06 in 1980 to 1.5 in 1995, and 0.3 
in December 2003.  It improved further to a new record low of 0.18 in March 2005 
(figure 6).  This places the company in a favorable position to undertake the huge capital 
expansion program that is planning to embark on in the very near future. 
 
Figure 6 Eskom debt/equity ratio, including long-term provisions 




It is important to note that this exceptional improvement in Eskom’s financial 
performance was brought about while the utility reduced its prices in real terms.  Indeed, 
since the late 1980s, Eskom’s average tariff increases have been consistently below 
inflation until 2003 when the trend was reversed (table 2). This pricing behavior reflected 
a compact between the government and a state-owned monopoly that has not been 
subjected to the detailed regulatory scrutiny that is generally imposed on the private 
electricity utilities of other countries.
28  In fact, between 1987 and 1995 (the year the 
National Electricity Regulator, NER, was established as the successor to the Electricity 
Control Board) Eskom was not subject to any formal regulation.
29  It simply proposed 
tariff adjustments to cover its declared costs that were not subjected to the traditional 
regulatory audit.  Still, price increases were consistently kept during that period below the 




                                                 
28 For example, in 1995 Eskom effectively committed itself to reduce the real price of electricity by 15 
percent over five years. (Eskom. 2003.  Generation Communication.  GFS 0014, Revision 1).   
29 Eberhard and Mtepa, ibid.   18
 
 
Table 2  Eskom average tariff increase compared to Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 
Source: van Heerden et al (2005).
30 
 
Continuity and Quality of Supply 
 
Continuity of electricity supply is characterized by the number and duration of 
supply interruptions, while quality of supply is measured in terms of acceptable values of 
voltage and frequency.  Reliability refers to the ability of the power system to provide an 
adequate and secure supply of electrical energy at any point in time--or equivalently, the 
degree to which the performance of the elements in a bulk system results in electricity 
being delivered to customers within accepted standards and in the amount desired.  In 
recent years, the reliability of electricity supply has become increasingly important to all 
classes of users—both businesses and households rely on electronic devices to perform 
an enormous range of tasks, both basic and advanced.  Supply interruptions can lead to 
loss of production and suspension of trading.  The cost of interruptions to industrial and 
commercial users can be high, depending on the frequency and duration of 
interruptions.
31 
                                                 
30 Heerden, J., Blignaur, J. and A. Jordaan. 2005. “On the Inflationary Effects of Higher Electricity prices 
in South Africa”.  Mimeo. 
31 The production of aluminum, for example, requires alumina and uninterrupted supply of electricity.  Any 
interruption in the supply of electricity to an aluminum smelter lasting longer than 6 hours can cause 
substantial damage to it.  Pots are used in the process of transforming alumina into primary aluminum.  
Pots cool off when they are deprived of electricity for six consecutive hours, which could cause the molten 
aluminum in the pot to solidify.  Another industry that is very sensitive to the quality of electricity supply is 
semiconductors.  The production of chips not only requires a lot of energy, but also a very stable supply of   19
Box 1  Key Technical Performance Indicators 
Unit Capability Factor (UCF) 
Unit capability factor is the percentage of maximum energy generation that a plant is capable of supplying to 
the electrical grid, limited only by factors within control of plant management.  A high unit capability factor 
indicates effective plan programs and practices to minimize unplanned energy losses and to optimize planned 
outages, maximizing available electrical generation. 
 
Unplanned Capability Loss Factor (UCLF) 
Unplanned capability loss factor is the percentage of maximum energy generation that a plant is not capable of 
supplying to the electrical grid because of unplanned energy losses (such as unplanned shutdowns, outage 
extensions or load reductions).  Energy losses are considered unplanned if they are not scheduled at least four 
weeks in advance.  A low value for this indicator indicates that important plan equipment is reliably operated 
and well maintained. 
 
Unplanned automatic grid separations per 7000 operating hours (UAGS) 
This indicator expresses how often a generator is separated from the external grid, in both an unplanned and 
automatic (manual actions are excluded manner); it is given as a rate per 7000 operating hours, thereby taking 
into account the wide variety of operating regimes. 
Source: UNIPEDE (2001). 
  
Continuity of Supply 
 
The continuity of electricity supply is influenced by the performance of all stages 
of electricity supply: generation, transmission and distribution. 
 
Generation Plant Performance 
 
Traditionally, the primary measures of plant reliability have been the Equivalent  
Availability Factor (EAF) and the Equivalent Forced outage Rate (EFOR) in North 
America (NERC), and the Unit Capability Factor (UCF) and the Unplanned Capability 
Loss Factor (UCLF) in Europe (UNIPEDE).  In analyzing Eskom’s generation plant 
performance we will adopt the UNIPEDE technical performance indicators (box 1). 
 
One key step towards meeting the objective of providing reliable electricity is to 
maintain and improve the availability of generating units.  In the late 1980s, Eskom’s 
generation plant performance had deteriorated, there was a high incidence of costly plant 
damage, and excessive unit trips, to the extent that by 1989 its Unplanned Capability 
Loss Factor (UCLF) reached the unacceptably high rate of 14 percent (figure 7). 
 
Similarly, during the same year, Eskom’s Unit Capability Factor (UCF) stood 
only just above 78 percent, and by 1990 it declined further to around 75 percent (figure 
14).
 32  These low plant availability rates resulted from many base load units requiring 
enhanced maintenance due to breakdowns.  During 1990, Eskom’s generating units 
                                                                                                                                                 
energy.  It is a continuous-process industry, so power interruptions can lead to the loss of production in 
progress. 
32 The unexpected bad weather during 1998 was also a major contributor towards the deterioration in these 
measures.     20
experienced on average 7 unplanned automatic grid separations (UAGS)--more than 
double the international best quartile which was below 3—indicating a large number of 
supply interruptions per operating period (7000 hours) and hence a low reliability of 
service provided to the electrical grid. 
  
























In response to the deterioration in plant performance, Eskom undertook a series of 
actions and supply-side management initiatives.  Key among these initiatives was 
Eskom’s generation plant availability improvement program which became known as “90 
: 7 : 3”.   The goal of this program was to make the system’s  representative plant 
available to supply power, on average, 90 percent of the time (Unit Capability Factor); 
limit the planned plant shutdowns for maintenance to 7 percent of the time (Planned 
Capability Loss Factor); restrict plant breakdowns and other unforeseen outages to 3 
percent of the time (Unplanned Capability Loss Factor). 
 
The “90 : 7 : 3” initiative led to significant improvements in plant performance.  
UCLF declined from the unacceptably high rate of 14 percent in 1988 down to 3.6 
percent at the end of 1997 (figure 7).  By 2002 it was further reduced to a world class rate 
of 3 percent.  Similar improvements were obtained in plant availability, especially during 
1995-1998, by reducing planned and unplanned outages.  By 1998, Eskom’s power 
stations reached an average generating unit UCF of 93 percent, just below the 
international best quartile but well above the international medial rate for that year.   
There was some deterioration after 2000 and during 2004-2005 the UCF rate fluctuated 
around 90 percent (figure 8).  The decline in average generating unit UCF during 2003 
was primarily due the catastrophic failure of the turbine generator of Unit 2 at Duvha 
Power Station.  Some of the observed deterioration may also be attributable to deliberate 
decisions by Eskom to optimize plant availability across its portfolio in favor of low cost   21
production.  Still, despite these abnormal plant failures, Eskom was still able to meet the 
significantly increased load growth during 2003.
33  
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Further evidence that the “90 : 7 : 3” initiative led to significant improvement in 
technical performance and availability is provided by the dramatic decrease in the 
                                                 
33 Eskom. 2005. Annual Report.   22
Box 2  Distribution Network Reliability Indices 
 
System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) 
The SAIFI of a network is the average frequency of sustained interruptions per customer. 
SAIFI = (Total number of customer interruptions p.a.) /(Total number of customers served)  
 
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) 
The SAIDI of a network, commonly referred to as customer minutes of interruption or customer hours, 
indicates the average duration of a sustained interruption the customer would experience per annum. 
SAIDI = (Sum of customer interruption durations p.a. ) / (Total number of customers served) 
 
Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI) 
The CAIDI of a network is the average time needed to restore service to the average customer per sustained 
interruption. 
CAIDI = (Sum of customer interruption durations p.a.) / (Total number of customer interruptions p.a.) 
 
Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index (MAIFI) 
The MAIFI of a network indicates how often on average (frequency) the customers served would experience a 
momentary interruption (MI) per annum. 
MAIFI = (Total number of customer MI p.a.) / (Total number of customers served) 
number of supply interruptions per operating period (7000 hours) that Eskom achieved 
especially between 1990 and 2000 (figure 9).   After 1995, its generating units have 
experienced fewer interruptions than even the international best quartile indicating world-
class plant management and maintenance.  In 2000, Eskom peaking stations set new 
records by claiming only 0.58 separations per 7000 hours well below the international 
best quartile for that year. 
 
Distribution System Performance   
 
Distribution problems can be divided into two main categories: (i) those affecting 
distribution lines--the potential causes of faults on distribution lines include storm / wind 
damage, lightning strikes, fallen trees or branches, bushfires, and animal incidents (large 
birds causing short circuits); those affecting distribution equipment such as transformers 
and related plant—unexpected load growth in particular locations can cause overloading 
of distribution transformers leading to overheating and failure in extreme weather 
conditions. 
 
Source: Kueck et al (2004).
34 
 
Frequency of sustained interruptions is perhaps the most important cause of 
consumer dissatisfaction with utility performance.  The measure most commonly used to 
record interruption data is the System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI).  
The duration of sustained interruptions is another strong factor in customer dissatisfaction 
                                                 
34 Kueck, J, Overholt, Kirby, B., Overholt, P. and L. Markel. 2004.  Measurement Practices for Reliability 
and Power Quality. ORNL/TM-2004/91, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.   23
with reliability.  As with SAIFI, the most commonly employed measure to record 
interruption data is the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI)--box 2.
35 
 
An analysis of Eskom’s distribution performance during 1997-1999 indicates that 
the number and duration of outages (SAIFI and SAIDI) were very high by international 
standards.  In 1999, for example, the average frequency of sustained interruptions in 
South Africa was 12.97 as compared to .40 in the Netherlands, 1.15 in Ireland, 1.22 in 
France, 1.38 in Sweden, 3.09 in Hungary, 3.32 in Finland, and 3.81 in Italy (figure 10).  
During the same year, the average time of customer interruption was 1796.4 minutes in 
South Africa as contrasted to 26 minutes in the Netherlands, 156.4 minutes in Spain, 
165.8 minutes in Sweden, 191.8 minutes in Italy, 198 minutes in Finland, 273.6 minutes 
in Ireland, 411.0 minutes in Hungary, and 459.0 minutes in France (figure 11).
36 
 

























































The deterioration in Eskom’s reliability metrics from 1997 to 1999 (SAIDI 
increased from 19.50 hours in 1977 to 29.94 hours in 1999, and SAIFI from 8.30 
interruptions in 1977 to 12.97 interruptions in 1999) was attributed by its management to 
the: (i) increase in the number of customers, which were typically prepaid customers at 
the end of weak networks, resulting in poorer performance of these networks; (ii) ageing 
of plant; and (iii) unexpectedly bad weather (heavy rain and floods) during 1998 and 
                                                 
35 A major drawback to reliability metrics is the difficulty of comparing them from one geographic area to 
another and exactly how to apply the input data in making the necessary calculations.  There are also 
concerns about how to normalize the indices for adverse weather. 
36 Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER). 2005. Third Benchmarking Report on Quality of 
Electricity Supply.  Brussels, Belgium. Ref: C05-QOS-01-03. 
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1999.  These negative trends led to a revision of the company’s emergency preparedness 
























  Sources: Eskom Annual Report (various years) and CEER (2005).
38 
 
In early 2000, the number of blackouts and brownouts began to increase.  These 
problems were largely attributed to the deteriorating condition of the distribution 
networks and their effective decapitalization due to the decreasing amounts that were 
budgeted and spent on maintenance by the provincial and local governments.  The NER 
conducted a number of surveys to assess the experience of electricity users and evaluate 
their interactions with the utilities.  It was found that: 
 
•  an increasing number of customers were not happy with their supply 
•  reliability and availability of electricity was the main reason 
•  customers claimed that the situation was deteriorating over time 
•  utilities did not give customers the attention they deserved 
•  some claimed that there was a visible lack of maintenance. 
 
The NER also contacted representative bodies of various customer categories 
according to the government’s Standard Industrial Classification.  The main findings of 
this survey were: 
 
                                                 
37 Eskom. 1999.  Annual Report. 
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•  more than 53 percent of respondents were not happy with interruption frequency 
and durations 
•  48 percent were not satisfied with response times to repair faults 
•  28 percent of respondents felt that they were not adequately consulted or informed 
about planned outages 
•  47 percent of respondents indicated that power quality was not adequate (low 
voltage and dips).   
* 
A separate survey was circulated to all distribution licensees (235 at that time) 
who were requested to provide data on network performance.  The survey found that: 
 
•  the quality of information submitted varied drastically 
•  only 30.7 percent of distributors responded and since the data requested was 
based on “of the shelf” information, it was concluded that these performance 
data were not being collected 
•  of the data supplied on 26 percent could be described as of reasonable quality, 
in terms of completeness and accuracy 
•  49 percent of respondents did not meet the minimum requirements for 
restoration of supply 
•  45 percent of respondents failed to identify areas requiring corrective action 
and only 2 percent were able to indicate what corrective actions they were 
taking 
•  network performance in rural areas was found to be much worse than in urban 
areas 
•  a general lack of understanding of Power Quality and Performance issues was 
identified 
•  those who based their responses on estimations demonstrated that their 
network performance was deteriorating 
•  there was no common yardstick for measuring performance 
•  some utilities were storing performance data only for annual submissions to 
NER, thus losing the value of analysis and corrective action 




The experience with supply interruptions in South Africa highlights the crucial 
role of the distribution system in the security and availability of supply to customers.  In 
general, the higher voltage systems (EHV, 132 kV and transmission systems) have 
duplicate supplies so that most faults at these voltages do not result in an interruption of 
supply to customers.  Almost all planned interruptions to supplies occur due to work on 
the LV and HV distribution networks.  Especially the HV system can have a large impact 
on overall system performance because much of it does not have duplicate or alternative 
supplies and each fault can affect a large number of customers.  And while each LV fault 
                                                 
39 This section is based on Balgobind, P.  2003. “National Summit on Maintenance of Electricity 
Distribution Networks”.  National Electricity Regulator. Quarterly Journal 2(2): 3-7.    26
does not affect as many customers as those at HV, still the poor condition of the LV 




Power quality (PQ) refers to the powering and grounding of sensitive equipment 
in a manner that is suitable to the operation of that equipment.  It may also be defined as 
the measure, analysis, and improvement of bus voltage, usually a load bus voltage, to 
maintain that voltage to be sinusoid at rated voltage and frequency. 
 
Electronic loads are susceptible to transients, sags, swells, harmonics, and 
momentary interruptions.  In the past, these disturbances were not cause for great 
concern.  However, today’s heavy reliance of businesses and households on sensitive 
electronic devices has rendered the quality of electric service as important as its 
reliability.  In view of the increased digital load, and the increased sensitivity of that load, 
events such as voltage sags, impulses, harmonics, and phase imbalance are now power 
quality concerns with a new significance attached to them, especially because they can 
have a huge economic impact.
40  Therefore, any analysis and discussion of electricity 
system reliability must also include an assessment of power quality.   
 
While reliability indices are well-defined (they describe clearly defined events) 
and widely used, power quality metrics are more controversial and frequently outdated.  
South Africa has played a leading role in power quality standardization.  The Quality 
Supply Standards, NRS-048, published during the period 1996-1998 (in five parts) 
provided the basis for evaluating the quality of supply delivered to customers by the 
industry, and the means for determining whether utilities meet the minimum standards 
required by the National Electricity Regulator.
41  This, it provided an improved power 
quality management foundation.  It is worth noting that the NRS-048 has been used and 
extensively referenced by other countries in Africa as well as by international technical 
bodies.     
 
The introduction of NRS-048 in 1996, paved the way to detailed power quality 
contracts at individual customer interfaces and bulk supply points.  These contracts 
included both utility and customer (emission) commitments.  In order to fulfill its 
contractual obligations, Eskom initiated a formal power quality monitoring program.  As 
a result, around 114 transmission and distribution (T&D) interface points (132 kV and 88 
kV) are being monitored on a continuous basis.  The quality parameters being measured 
are those associated with voltage waveform (regulation, harmonics, unbalance) and 
voltage dips (box 3)
42. 
                                                 
40 For example, just a few years ago, a voltage sag would be frequently classified as a drop by 40 percent or 
more for 60 cycles, but today, it may be a drop of 15 percent for only 5 cycles. 
41 The 1996 edition of NRS 048 was developed mainly by the regulated utilities themselves with some 
input from end-users.  In 2003, NRS-048-2 was developed by joint working group comprising the National 
Electricity Regulator, utilities, and end-customers.  
42 Eskom groups voltage sags into five classes: class Y (80%-90% magnitude, 20ms-3sec duration); class X 
(40%-80% magnitude, 20ms-150ms duration); class S (40%-80% magnitude, 150ms-600ms duration); 
class T (0-40% magnitude, 20ms-600ms duration); class Z (0-80% magnitude, 600ms-3sec duration).    27
Box 3  Power Quality Indices 
 
Total harmonic distortion (THD) 




The unbalance is a condition in a poly-phase system in which the rms values of the line voltages (fundamental 
component), and/or the phase angles between consecutive line voltages, are not equal. 
 
Voltage dips 
Voltage dips, also called sags, are brief reductions in AC main voltage and are characterized by a pair of data: 
retained voltage or depth and duration--reduction of the supply voltage to a value between 90% and 1% of the 





Voltage magnitude performance improved substantially through the use of PQ 
instruments providing data directly to the national control center.  When NRS-048 was 
implemented in 1996, there was a large measured gap between actual performance and 
the limits set in the standard.  These gaps led to customer unhappiness and complaints 
about the quality of power supply.  One quality metric that was particularly problematic 
                                                                                                                                                 
Source:  Voltage Sag Indices – Draft 2 working document for IEEE P1564, November 2001 
(http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/sag/IEEEP1564_02_01.doc). 
 
43 Joint Working Group Cigre C4.07/Cired. 2004. Power Quality Indices and Objectives—Final WG 
Report. 




























































Figure 12  Dip performance vs NRS-048 limits 
(Type X dips for network voltages between 44kV and 132 kV) 
 
Source: Koch et al (2003).   28
for the utility was the number of voltage dips which were consistently higher than the 
limits set by NRS-048 (figure 12).
44 
 
From Eskom’s perspective its inability to meet the dip voltage limits set by NRS-
048 implied that such limits were unrealistic and could not be achieved without 
substantial upgrading investment in the network.  In response to these difficulties of 
managing dip performance, and after extensive consultations with the various 
stakeholders (utilities, equipment manufacturers, end-users, standards bodies, etc.), NER, 
in 2002, issued a new Directive on Power Quality.
45  Under this new PQ framework, the 
transmission and distribution utilities were no longer required to meet global dip limits.  
Instead the focus shifted away from the number of dip events on how the utility interacts 
with its customers, and the causes of specific events that affect sensitive customers.   
Network planning, operation, and maintenance management received increased attention.  
The implementation of high priority maintenance and reliability projects led to 
improvements in waveform quality and disturbance indicators (table 3). 
 
Table 3  Eskom’s power quality indicators 
   Waveform quality  Disturbance  








2000 95.8  99.1  100  86.8 92.6 97.1 94.1 
   (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.)  (n.a.)  (n.a.)  (n.a.)  (n.a.) 
2001 95.8  99.1  100  92.6 95.6 100 98.5 
   (95) (95) (95)  (95)  (95)  (95)  (95) 
2002 98  98.4  100  98.8  96.4  100  95.2 
   (95) (95) (95)  (95)  (95)  (95)  (95) 
2003 98.7  99.2  100  98.6 100 100 100 
   (97) (97) (97)  (96)  (96)  (96)  (96) 
2004 98.9  99.5  100  97.6 99.4 99.4 99.4 
   (96.2) (97)  (98)  (96.2)  (96.2)  (96.2)  (96.2) 
2005
* 99.5  100  100  96.3 96.3 99.4 98.8 
   (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.)  (n.a.)  (n.a.)  (n.a.)  (n.a.) 




This section examines Eskom’s labor and capital productivity and compares them 




In many developing and transition economies (DTEs), state ownership in the 
electricity sector has been associated with extraordinarily high excess employment. 
                                                 
44 Koch, R., Sigwebela, I. and H. Geldenhuys. 2003.  “A Summary of South-African Experience with 
Power Quality Management”.  CIRED 2003, Round Table on Power Quality at the Interface T&D. 
45 National Electricity Regulator. 2002. “NER Power Quality Directive”. Directive of the South African 
Electricity Regulator, Revision 1.5, April 2002.   29
Efficiency and competitiveness require eliminating redundant jobs.  As part of the 
restructuring and privatization process, many utilities in the DTEs implemented labor 
rationalization programs that led to substantial shedding of excess employment.  It is 
important to note that in South Africa, there was an over 50 percent reduction in the 
number of workers employed by the publicly owned electricity utility Eskom from over 
66,000 in 1985 to 32,800 in 2000 (and a further reduction of 17 percent from 2000 to 
2003).
46    These reductions led to dramatic increases in labor productivity since they 
were taking place while Eskom was experiencing a robust growth in sales.  Labor 
productivity in South Africa’s electricity supply industry, as measured by sales per 
employee, more doubled between 1996 and 2004 (figure 13). 
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* The figure refers to the 15-month period from 1 January 2004 to 31 March 2005 
Source: Eskom Annual Report (various years). 
 
The above increases in the labor productivity of the electricity supply industry 
were obtained during a period when South Africa registered only very modest overall 
labor productivity growth, falling behind many other African economies and raising 
serious concerns about the country’s eroding competitive position.  Indeed, during 1995-
2002, South Africa’s labor productivity growth was low and lagged all but the South 
American economies in its income group (figure 14). 
 
Despite the impressive gains in labor productivity of recent years, Eskom still 
ranks well below many systems from the advanced industrial countries (figure 15). 
 
                                                 




Figure 14  Comparative labor productivity performance 
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47 Porter, M. 2003. “The Competitive Advantage of South Africa”.  Presentation, Johannesburg,  South 
Africa.   31
Capital Productivity 
 
The measurement of capital productivity in electricity generation is complicated 
by the fact that electricity is not storable and is subject to peak demands both daily and 
seasonally.  A variety of indicators have been traditionally employed providing 
information on different aspects of capital asset performance.  Two of the most widely 
indicators are the capacity factor or generation load factor and the reserve plant margin 
(RPM).  The capacity factor is the total energy produced for a specified period relative to 
the total possible amount of energy that could have been produced for the same period.
48  
Thus it shows the average utilization of available generating capacity for electricity 
production in a year.  The RPM is meant to indicate the ability of the electricity system’s 
generation plant to cope with the estimated peak (instantaneous) demands on the 
system.
49   
 
A high capacity factor indicates that a generator is operating close to effective 
plant capacity.  Given that generation is very capital intensive, excess capacity can be 
very costly.   





For over two decades, from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s, Eskom 
implemented a sustained and very extensive capacity expansion program.  This expansion 
                                                 
48 Total period energy generated (MWh)*100 / Total installed capacity (MW)*period hours. 
49 It is measured by: 1. summing the supply capacities of all power stations able to operate at any time 
during a particular interval of time (usually the three winter months or the three summer minths); 2. 
dividing by the total power station sent out supply required to meet the maximum peak (instantaneous) 
demand estimated for that interval of time; 3. taking away 1. 
50 Eberhard (2004), ibid.   32
was stimulated by the substantial changes in the relative prices of primary energy sources 
that followed the oil shocks of the 1970s.  A state-led drive to flesh out as much oil as 
possible from the economy led to a significant growth in electricity demand as energy-
intensive industries were encouraged to shift from oil to coal-based electricity.
51  Annual 
growth in peak demand ranged between 6 and 16 percent between 1972 and 1982.  The 
prospect of potential power shortages led Eskom engineers and planners to a power 
station construction spree.  By the end of 1983, 22,260 MW of additional generation 
capacity had been ordered, double the operating capacity during that year.
52   The growth 
in capacity expansion was especially striking between 1974 and 1993 (figure 16). 
 
Figure 17  Eskom’s excess capacity and growth in peak demand 
 
        Source: Eberhard and Mtepa (2003). 
 
For over 20 years, Eskom has had surplus generating capacity.  It is true that a 
fundamental design attribute of electricity markets, in both the franchise monopoly and 
the liberalized market eras, is the requirement to construct and maintain extra generating 
capacity.  This is due to the inherent fluctuation and uncertainty in demand and supply, 
the non-storability of electric power, and the long lead-time for capacity expansion.   
When generating capacity just equals an electric market’s coincident peak demand, there 
is no room for error.  If the coincident peak demand exceeds projections, or if generating 
plants expected to be available are not, shortages and blackouts result.  From a technical 
perspective, generation adequacy can be achieved by requiring electric utilities to 
                                                 
51 This shift away from oil was also motivated by the increasing isolation of the government of South 
Africa and the economic sanctions that were imposed by the international community in retaliation to 
apartheid. 
52 Eberhard and Mtepa (2003).   33
maintain capacity reserves—generally set about 15 percent above the forecast, 
coincident, non-interruptible demand peak.  The cost of such reserve capacity is 
traditionally recovered through an insurance premium against interruption in the rates 
paid by retail customers.  In most countries, the optimal market equilibrium with respect 
to capacity and reserve margin is not reached much of the time.  Also, it is widely 
accepted that that the social cost of overinvestment (higher electricity cost) is small 
relative to the social cost of underinvestment (shortages and blackouts that can have 
hugely disruptive effects with severe economic and social consequences).  Thus, if some 
deviation from the optimum level of capacity is inevitable, society should err on the side 
of overinvestment. 
 
Sub-optimal use of generation capital is not unique to Eskom.  State-owned 
utilities, in particular, have historically had difficulty making economically efficient new 
generation capacity investment decisions.
53  However, Eskom’s capacity expansion 
program was too excessive relative to demand growth.  From 1980 to 2000, its reserve 
margin rates far exceeded those dictated by reliability and adequacy considerations.  In  
the early 1990s, those reserve margin rates fluctuated just below 40 percent (figure 16).  
The presence of excess capacity over and far above the generally required rate of 15 
percent reserve margin for such a long time period clearly signifies gross inefficiency in 
investment (figure 17).  It also raises serious questions about the sector’s governance 
structure and the manner in which decisions were made with respect to capacity 
requirements and the allocation of the costs of reserve margins.   
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* refers to period Jan. 2004 – Mar. 2005. 
Source: Eskom Annual Report (various years). 
                                                 
53 Wolak, F. 2005. “Market Design and Price Behavior in Restructured Electricity Markets: An 
International Comparison”.   34
The costs of Eskom’s capacity expansion program (which run until the mid 
1990s), the concomitant increase of its debt burden, the lower than expected demand 
(Eskom’s load factor declined precipitously from 1975 to 1993—figure 18), and the 
utility’s monopoly position, naturally generated pressures for price increases.  As it is 
typical of utilities with monopoly power, Eskom simply passed the costs of its poor 
investment decisions on to consumers.  By the late 1970s, electricity prices in South 
Africa increased drastically from a band of around 11 c/kWh to approximately 16 c/kWh 
(1988 values).  This represented an increase of 45 percent in real terms (figure 19).
 54 
 
The substantial price increases from 1975 to 1978 were followed by another 
round of increases in the early 1980s (figure 19).  This second round of price increases 
led to a public outcry and ultimately to the establishment of the De Villiers Commission 
of Enquiry into Eskom’s activities.  The Commission was critical of the utility’s 
governance and management structures, electricity forecasting methods, investment 
decisions and accounting.
55  In particular, the Commission concluded that Eskom’s 
investment planning was highly defective and that it substantially overinvested in 
generating capacity. 
 
Figure 19  Historic Eskom prices and average price increases 
 





                                                 
54 Steyn, G. 2001. Administered Prices—Electricity.  A report for national Treasury. 
55 Cassim, R., Akinboade, O., Niedermeier, E. and F. Sibanda. 2004.  Sustainable Development:  The Case 
of Energy in South Africa.  Trade Knowledge Network Paper, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development., Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.   35
Security of Supply 
 
A system’s installed generating capacity can be considered adequate when peak 
demand for electricity is covered by an adequate reserve margin--the difference between 
the peak load and the portion of electric resources that are expected to be able to operate 
during the peak load.  If planned maintenance can be performed outside the seasonal 
peak, the reserve margin must allow for forced (unplanned) outages of generating plant—
the system’s operating reserve must be sufficient to withstand the loss of the largest plant. 
 
As figure 20 indicates, by 2002 South Africa’s high spare capacity and more than 
adequate reserve margin came to an end.  The system’s five-year forward committed 
plant reserve margin has been declining to below the active plant reserve margin since 
2000 when the last generating unit was placed in operation.
56   This forward reserve  
margin declined from about 30 percent in 1998, to 13.6 percent in 2002, and just over 10 
percent in 2003, indicating a very tight demand/supply balance (figure 20). 
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The generation of electricity from fossil fuels, notably coal and natural gas, is a 
major and growing contributor to the emission of carbon dioxide—a greenhouse gas that 
                                                 
56 Vundule, C, Boeije, W. and E. Viljoen. 2003. “Proposed Key Performance Indicators for the Electricity 
Industry in South Africa”.  NER Quarterly Journal 4: 14-29.   36
contributes significantly to global warming.  Coal-fired generation releases more carbon 
per kilowatt-hour that natural-gas-fired and oil-fired generation.  Because of its heavy 
reliance on cheap, low-grade coal, Eskom is the primary source of greenhouse emissions 
in South Africa.  The coal-fired stations in South Africa were designed to remove dust 
and other particles from the waste gases but none are fitted with scrubbers to remove 
oxides of sulfur and nitrogen.  This was because the use of scrubbers would increase the 
cost of electricity substantially.  For example, Eskom estimated that if desulphurization 
plants were to be installed at all of its coal-fired power stations, the cost of electricity 
would go up by as much as 20 percent.
57 
 
Eskom’s coal-fired power stations are responsible for 66 percent of the 6,000 tons 
of sulfur dioxide (SO2) pollution that is spewed into South Africa’s atmosphere daily.  
By comparison, the country's four oil refineries together are responsible for only 1.6 
percent.
58  Furthermore, most of Eskom’s power stations are located within a 100 km 
radius in Mpumalanga and this concentration exacerbates the pollution problem. 
 
In recent years, Eskom has implemented a variety of measures to mitigate the 
adverse environmental impacts of coal combustion.  Through improved technology (e.g. 
the use of electrostatic precipitators) more than 99 percent of the ash is extracted from the 
combustion gases before it is released into the atmosphere.
59  The cleansed gas is released 
through chimney stacks that are tall enough to ensure that the oxides of sulfur and 
nitrogen are released above the natural inversion layer of the atmosphere (approximately 
250 meters above ground) where atmospheric conditions are more favorable for their 
dispersal and dilution.  However, although this reduces ground level concentration of 
these pollutants, they can combine with moist air and rain at higher levels and cause acid 
rain in areas far from the source of pollution. 
 
During the past decade, Eskom has made considerable progress in reducing 
particulate emissions (figure 21).  Thus, although between 1999 and 2003 the electricity 
generated by its coal-fired stations increased by 6,697GWh, total particulate emissions 
were reduced from 1999 levels.  In the last few years, Eskom has consistently met its 
internal relative performance targets for particulate emissions which during 2005 were 
reduced to 0.26 kg/MWh sent out.  
 
                                                 
57 The economic and social tradeoff becomes immediately obvious.  At the same cost, electricity could be 
provided to approximately 240,000 people in township areas.  If, on the other hand, these people without 
electricity they would have to rely on traditional fuels which can also generate significant levels of 
pollution. 
58 Gosling, M. 2005.  “Eskom to Blame for Most Sulphur Pollution”.  Cape Times:  August 24, 2005.  
59 The operation of electrostatic precipitators is based on the principles of magnetism.  The dust-laden 
gasses pass through a chamber where the dust particles are ionized by a high voltage negative direct 
current.  The charged dust particles are removed from the gas stream onto the collecting electrodes.  
Intermittent blows cause the particles to drop into dust hoppers located below the electrodes. [Eskom. 2005. 
“Particulate Emission Control at Coal Fired Power Station”.  Generation Communications: GFS 0021, 
Revision 3 (June 2005)].   37
An accelerated and sustainable 
electrification programme must provide 
access to electricity for an additional 2.5 
million households by the year 2000, 
thereby increasing the level of access to 
electricity to about 72% of all households. 
 
ANC, 1994. The Reconstruction and 





Figure 21  Eskom’s relative particulate emissions 
 
 
  Source: Eskom (2005).  Annual Report. 
 
 
The Electrification Program 
  
The government that came to power after the first democratic elections in 1994 
expressed a strong commitment to a new multiracial, multicultural and democratic South 
Africa.  It was also equally determined to redress the social and economic inequities that 
were perpetuated by several decades of apartheid policies.  An important goal of the 
newly-elected government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was to 
substantially increase the access to basic services by the poor and other disadvantaged 
groups that comprised the majority of the country’s population. 
 
“Access to electricity for all” was a 
key election slogan of the African 
National Congress (ANC), the party that 
won the election.  In 1993, only 36 percent 
of the country’s population, mostly in the 
urban areas, was connected to the 
electricity grid.  This low coverage ratio is 
not surprising since under the apartheid 
system, the main focus of power sector 
policy was on heavy industry, mining, and   38
the white households that comprised approximately 12 percent of the total population.  In 
the rural areas, while the dwellings of white households were mostly electrified, their 
black counterparts had to rely on traditional fuels such as wood, coal, paraffin, animal 
and crop wastes.  The heavy use of such traditional fuels was associated with high levels 
of indoor air pollution, which in turn led to increased levels of respiratory infections, 
especially among women and young children who generally spend most of the day at 
home.  Pneumonia, in particular, imposed a serious burden on the South African health 
services.  However, with the introduction of the National Electrification Programme 
(NEP) in 1994, electrification rates have increased dramatically.  Indeed, the NEP has 
proven to be one of the world’s most effective policies for electrifying low-income 
households in urban and rural areas.
60  
 
Accelerated Electrification--Phase 1 of the NEP, 1994-1999 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Eskom initiated its “Electricity for All” 
campaign to start addressing the backlog and severe inequities in electricity provision.
61  
This electrification program commenced at the same time as the country’s political 
balance begun to shift and a definite political change from apartheid to a broadly based 
political democracy was underway.  The program’s stated electrification goals were 
increasingly seen as too modest in view of the great disparities in electricity provision 
that were perpetuated by the “separate development” policies under the apartheid system.  
Thus, in the changing political environment of the early 1990s, the progress achieved by 
Eskom’s “Electricity for All” initiative was seen as being too slow. 
 
An extensive consultative process to formulate a new energy policy for South 
Africa begun well before the democratic elections and government change of 1994.   
Indeed, prior to 1994, many groups were working with the ANC towards formulating a 
more socially equitable national energy policy.
62  For example, in February 1992, the 
Energy and Development Research Centre (EDRC) of the University of Cape Town 
organized a meeting on electrification in South Africa under the auspices of the 
Department of Economic Planning of the ANC.  The meeting brought together members 
of the industry, trade unions, municipalities, university researchers and other policy 
makers, and civic organizations.  One of the important ideas that emerged from the 
meeting was to convene a national conference on electrification and to create a 
negotiating forum between government and business, labor, and opposition groups.  After 
two national conferences on electrification involving most stakeholders and more than 70 
organizations, the National Electrification Forum (NELF) was launched in 1993 to 
facilitate the consultative process and develop an implementable strategy for the 
                                                 
60 Gaunt, C.T. 2005. “Meeting electrification's social objectives in South Africa.”  Energy Policy, 33 (10): 
1309-1317. 
 
61 Mare, P. 1999. “Eskom Electrification Beyond 1999”. Domestic Use of Electrical Energy Conference 
1999. 
62 University of Cape Town (Energy Research Centre). 2004. Energy for Sustainable Development: South 
African Profile.  Phase 1 final report.   39
accelerated electrification of South Africa.
63  The primary goal of this strategy was to 
increase access to electricity services in the underdeveloped urban, peri-urban and rural  
 




areas where the black (80 percent of the population) lived. 
 
The NELF played an important role in identifying the key issues facing the 
electricity sector and was very instrumental in achieving a consensus for addressing these 
challenges.  One of the most important outcomes of these deliberations was a compact 
between the government and the electricity supply industry to connect 2.5 million new 
households to the national grid between 1994 and 1999, thereby increasing the national 
level of access to electricity to about 70 percent (figure 22). The expansion was to be 
funded entirely by the industry itself and implemented by Eskom and the 
municipalities.
64  Large-scale farms were also to play some role by connecting their farm 
workers where necessary.  Its main targets were the rural and low-income urban areas, as 
well as, all schools and clinics.  A total of 25,900 rural schools and 2,000 health clinics 
were identified for electrification. 
 
Under Eskom’s “Electricity for All” program, approximately 618,000 new 
households were connected between 1991 and 1993.
 65  Thus progress was slow.  During 
                                                 
63 Eberhard, A. 2003  “The Political, Economic, Institutional and Legal Dimensions of Electricity Supply 
Industry Reform in South Africa”.  Working Paper Series, Center for Environmental Science and Policy, 
Stanford University. 
64 It should be noted that Eskom had also made a commitment to reduce electricity tariffs by 15 percent, in 
real terms, during the same period. 
65 National Electricity Regulator. 2000.  Lighting Up South Africa.   40
Phase 1 (1994-1999) of the NEP, on the other hand, over 2.8 million households were 
connected to the electricity grid, increasing the level of electrification from 36 percent in 
1994 to 68 percent at the end of 1999.  The urban areas, served mainly by the 
municipalities, were already substantially electrified by 1990.  Eskom, on the other hand, 
had fewer than 112,000 domestic customers in 1990.
66  Thus, the new connections were 
mostly extended by Eskom, which accounted for about two-thirds of them (figure 23). 
 
The accelerated electrification program was executed with funds raised by Eskom 
through internal cross-subsidies and a surcharge on electricity sales, as well as, through 
debt financing by Eskom and the different municipalities.  Under an agreement 
negotiated by the National Electricity Regulator (NER), Eskom was to transfer R300 
million per annum (escalating at the rate of the approved Eskom tariff increases) to the 
municipalities for 5 years to help finance their electrification projects.  Thus, Eskom 
effectively financed the bulk of the electrification program.  The electrification fund was 
administered by the NER.  A committee consisting of staff and members of NER’s 
Board, representatives from the South African Local Government Association,  
 





                                                 
66  Eskom. 1990.  Annual Report.   41
      
Development Bank of Southern Africa, Association of Municipal Electricity Undertakers, 
and the Department of Minerals and Energy, approved the criteria for the fund’s 
allocation and the actual final distributions.  
                             
A comparison of the NEP’s targets with the actual connections reveals that the 
yearly targets were exceeded from 1994 to 1997 (figure 24).  Even though the targets 
were not met in 1998 and 1999, still by the end of 2001, over 3.4 million new households 
were connected to the electricity grid.  The total capital invested between over the 7-year 
period amounted to R8.9 billion and the average cost per connection was around R2,867.   
 
Figure 24  Electrification targets and connections: 1994-2000 
 
  Source: NER (2000).  Lighting Up South Africa. 
 
There is much to applaud in South Africa’s electrification program—from its 
planning and ambitious targets to its significant cost-reducing innovations and 
responsiveness to the requirements and needs of the customers.  Thus the program’s 
success was not limited to the impressive gains in coverage within the span of just a few 
years.  Dramatic reductions in the capital investment costs of rural connections were 
achieved through careful network design and planning that matched technology and 
capacity more closely to customer needs and demands. These innovations included the 
application of single-phase distribution and the extensive use of pre-payment metering.
67, 
68    
                                                 
67 Single Phase Earth Return System (SWER) distribution employs a single metallic conductor and uses the 
earth as a return conductor.  With good soil conductivity, SWER systems with an aluminum conductor 
(size 75 mm
2) could typically transfer about 500 kW at distances up to 25 km at voltages of 19.1 kV.  With 
a cheaper steel conductor (22 mm
2) SWER could transfer 200kW about 25 km at 19.1 kV and a maximum   42
Between 1995 and 2001, the average cost of rural electrification declined 40 
percent in current terms and 70 percent after adjusting for inflation (figure 25).
  69   
Moreover, by 2001 the average costs per rural and urban connections were roughly the 
same (table 4)—thus raising doubts about the longstanding notion that rural 
electrification is much more expensive than urban electrification.
70                      
 
 Figure 25 Average cost per connection: 1994-2001 
 
 
                   
 
Table  4 Average cost per connection: 1995 and 2001 
   
          Source: Gaunt (2005). 
                                                                                                                                                 
voltage drop of 5 percent.  Single-phase distribution systems could yield cost reductions of up to 40 percent 
in comparison to the standard three-phase designs.  Eskom adopted the single-phase strategy for 
electrifying rural areas like the Northern Province, Eastern Cape, and KwaZulu Natal.  By 2004, at least 
100,000 customers had single-phase service in South Africa. [StonePowerAB. 2004. Cost Effective 
Electrical Networks.  www.stonepower.se/Lowcostnetworks.htm .] 
68 The pre-payment system consists of : (i) pre-payment meters also called Electricity Dispensers (EDs) that 
are installed in the customers’ premises; (ii) vending  machines, also known as Credit Dispensing Units 
(CDUs), where the customer can purchase electricity credit; and (iii) Data Concentrators that collect the 
transaction data from the CDUs.  Every ED has a unique serial number.  The customer buys a credit token 
from a CDU, takes it home, and enters it into his ED.  If the token is valid (each token is purchased for a 
specific ED) then the ED adds the credit purchased to the credit currently in the ED.  Eskom also offers a 
numeric token for its machines--a simple piece of paper with a 20-digit number printed on it.  This number 
is entered into the ED via itsa keyboard.  Numeric tokens have the advantage of facilitating credit sales 
over the telephone.  World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2204). Eskom: Electrification 
for All. 
69 The Producer Price Index (PPI) was used for calculating the real connection costs.  The base year was 
2000 and the average PPI in 1994 was 66.7.  
70 Gaunt (2005),  ibid.    43
 
By targeting the disadvantaged and rural households, the NEP made a substantial 
contribution towards reducing the huge “energy divide” in South Africa between the 
urban and mostly poor and disadvantaged rural areas (figure 26).  In 1995, 76 percent of 
the urban and only 21 percent of the rural households were connected to the national 
electricity grid.  By 2003, the percentage of electrified households in the rural almost 
tripled to 54 percent while those in the urban areas rose only slightly to 79 percent.
71  
 
Figure 26  Trends in electrification of households in South Africa: 1995-2003 
  Source:  NER (2003). 
 
Despite the increased access to electricity, many of the newly connected 
households were simply too poor to benefit substantially from it.  Electricity consumption 
has been much lower than initially anticipated and well below the level needed for 
financial break-even.  Approximately 56 percent of the households connected to the 
national grid have been found to consume less than 50 kWh of electricity per month.
72  A 
consumption level of 350 kWh was assumed under the NEP planning.  As a result, the 
electrification of the poor and rural areas is not financially viable (table 5).  
 
Electrification Beyond 1999—Sustainability Challenges 
  
The National Electrification Program has arguably been one of the most 
successful elements of the South African Reconstruction and Development Program.   
Within a decade, the number of domestic electricity customers doubled making the 
                                                 
71 The fluctuations around the peak in electrification reached in 1999 were primarily due to changes in the 
estimates of population and number of households.  For example, the estimated number of households in 
2000 was adjusted substantially on the basis of information obtained from the 1999 October Household 
Survey. 
72 Prasad, G. and H. Ranninger. 2003. “The Social Impact of the Basic Electricity Support Tariff ”.  
Domestic Use of Energy Conference, Cape Town, 2003.  Cape Technikon: 17-22.   44
electrification rates during Phase 1 the highest in the world.  And this was achieved 
without external funding.  Disadvantaged urban and rural areas, as well as schools and 
clinics without electricity, were connected to the national grid.  However, more urban 
than rural areas were electrified as the latter are further from the grid and more dispersed 
(figure 27).  Thus, a significant urban-rural electricity divide remained at the end of Phase 
1 of the NEP when over 54 percent of the rural households still had no electricity 
connection. 
 
Table 5  Summary of key NEP financial and economic indicators 
 




Figure 27  Urban and rural electrification connections: 1990-2001 
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Source: Gaunt (2005). 
 
  Phase 2 of the electrification program was started in 2000.  Its main target was to 
provide 300,000 new households with electricity connections every year.   
 
Performance Problems in the Distribution Industry 
 
While the generation and transmission segments of the industry have been 
operating reasonably efficiently, the electricity distribution industry (EDI) has been 
marred by serious structural problems and has been in serious financial trouble for 




The total number of local authorities was reduced, through amalgamations, from 
over 800 to just below 380 in 2001.
74  Thus, approximately 360 municipalities, Eskom, 
and about 13 private distributors were at one time engaged in the business of distributing 
electricity in South Africa.  The authority of municipalities to engage in the provision of 
infrastructural services like roads, water and sanitation, health services, and electricity is 
supported by the Constitution.  With respect to electricity services, the Constitution states 
that “A municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has the right to 
administer…electricity reticulation.”
75  Only a very few municipalities have been 
generating their own power.  The majority of them have been purchasing power from 
Eskom for resale to consumers within their boundaries. 
 
Until recently, therefore, the distribution industry was highly fragmented with one 
very large, several medium-sized, and too many very small, financially non-viable, and 
poorly-run municipal distributors.   These structural arrangements in the EDI were not the 
result of any rational planning and thus formed no coherent pattern.  Not surprisingly, 
consumers have been facing significantly different tariffs and quality of service standards 
across the country.  In particular: 
•  the reliability of supply and the ability of municipal distributors to offer secure 
service to low income households has differed markedly across the country; 
•   significant disparities have existed in the structure of tariffs and these differences 
exhibited little or no relationship to the quality of service provided, the cost of 
supply, or consumers’ ability to pay (table 6); 
•  unfair discrepancies have existed between Eskom Distribution and municipal 
distributors purchasing tariffs from Eskom Transmission--to the benefit of some 




                                                 
74 The number of municipal councils was further reduced to 284 by 2005.  Oxford Analytica (2005), ibid. 
75 Eberhard, A. 2005. “New Electricity Regulation Bill Proposes Radical Changes”.  AMEU Bulletin 
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Many of the municipal 
distribution companies are 
financially non-viable as a result 
of operating inefficiencies, lack of 
technical capacity, theft, and a 




In recent years, the municipal 
distribution companies have been experiencing 
serious financial problems.  Many of them have 
been saddled with mounting debts, large arrears 
to Eskom for the bulk supply of electricity, and 
some have been effectively on the brink of 
bankruptcy.  Inevitably, these chronic financial 
difficulties have undermined the ability of these 
distribution entities to provide adequate and reliable electricity service and to expand 
coverage.  There are several factors that contributed to the deteriorating financial 
performance of the municipal electricity distributors. 
 
 
Table 6   Sample municipal electricity tariffs, 2003-04 
 
 
Source:  Trends in Intergovernmental Finances: 2000/01 - 2006/07. 
 
When the ANC-led government assumed office in 1994, it inherited a relatively 
disorganized and racially segregated public finance system.  The former government 
policies did not promote, or arguably inhibited, the level of commercial and industrial 
activity in black areas that would yield a tax base sufficient to support adequate 
municipal services.  Moreover, a practice of non-payment arose in the black 
municipalities (perhaps as a protest against the social policies under apartheid) that 
exacerbated the financial plight of those municipalities.  The new government promptly 
introduced a medium-term expenditure program that sought to reduce the national fiscal   47
deficit, extend the tax base, and improve revenue collection.  This stabilization program 
was then extended to the provincial level.  However, it was not until 2000 that a new 
system of local government was implemented was implemented to replace the diverse 
and racially segregated structures that operated in the apartheid era.  The pace of 
implementation and reform at the local level has been slow for several reasons: 
 
•  Under the new local government system, well-off former ‘white’ areas, generally 
well served by physical infrastructure, were merged with impoverished and 
underdeveloped black townships.  This created additional strain, both financially 
and physically, on the capacity of local councils to deliver services and 
businesses, including the supply of electricity. 
•  In the 1980s, a culture of non-payment of local rates and user charges developed 
in many black areas.  The local government deficits were written off by central 
government.  Despite the political legitimacy of the new authorities, the non-
payment culture persisted post-1994 and, in some instances, spread beyond the 
black areas, thereby perpetuating the problem of indebtedness. 
•  The national shortage of skills and experience in running representative and 
accountable governmental structures is particularly evident at local level, and 
has inhibited the implementation of reforms.
76 
 
Prior to 1996, the government provided an operating subsidy to the municipalities.  
This subsidy was not adjusted to reflect inflation and in some cases it actually declined 
even in nominal terms.  Thus, despite the consolidation many of the newly created 
municipalities could not cope financially or technically in many areas of service 
provision, including electricity distribution.
77  
 
In the early years of the transformation, the EDI as a whole seemed to be financially 
solvent.  For example, in 1996 total revenues exceeded total costs by nearly R 1.2 billion, 
net of the more than R 1.3 billion in electrification costs incurred that year.   Still, 
because of the manner in which these revenues were distributed, many of the smaller 
municipalities were revenue inadequate.  In 1994, four municipalities earned 50 percent 
of the surplus, 22 municipalities earned 75 percent and the top 100 earned 99 percent of 
the total, respectively. This left the remaining 300 municipalities collectively earning less 
than 1 percent of the total surplus for that year. The 12 largest municipalities accounted 
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Overall, South Africa’s performance in the electricity sector (measured by the seven 
indicators discussed below) compared to the upper-middle income country benchmark is 
relatively weak in terms of access, but favorable in terms of technical efficiency (i.e., 
percentage of system losses) and pricing. The relatively low access reflects in large part 
the legacy of apartheid, that left large segments of the population—especially the poor––
outside the network of basic service provision. Since 1994, a significant area of policy 
success has been to increase service access, but the level remains behind the average 
expectation for upper middle-income countries. Low aggregate losses reflect solid 
internal technical efficiency of the electricity network, but this hides the problem of 
outages in specific areas, even in large cities such as Johannesburg.  Low prices reflect 
the comparatively low cost of South Africa’s electricity (produced almost exclusively 
from low-grade coal) and the fact that a good part of the capital stock has already been 
depreciated as there has been little investment in the sector over the past two decades.  
The overall picture, therefore, suggests that despite recent gains, one of the main 
weakness in South Africa’s electricity sector lies in access which remains limited, 
particularly in terms of service delivery to the poor. 
 
 




















Not surprisingly, South Africa’s access to the electricity network is superior to the 
rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with 66 percent of the population having access, 
compared to 15 percent for region as a whole (figure 28).  Access has also risen 
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substantially in South Africa, from some 30 percent ten years ago reflecting the success 
to date of the policy of widening access to the electricity network. Nevertheless, South 
Africa’s level of overall access remains significantly behind—by about a third—its own 
income group of upper middle-income countries (87 percent). A related (and 
corroborating) statistic focusing on households indicates that about 65 percent of all 
households in South Africa report having access to electricity compared to 23 percent for 




South African average end-user prices (US cents/kwh) are some of the cheapest in 
the world at 3 cents for residential and 2 cents for non-residential customers. By 
comparison, these user prices in upper middle income countries are, on average, about 9 
and 7 cents, respectively, while SSA rates are 6 and 5 cents. The world average is 9 cents 
for residential customers and 6 cents for non-residential customers. In South Africa, the 
low user prices do not seem to reflect obvious underpricing, as is the case in many 
developing countries with the attendant quasi-fiscal losses. Instead, it is a consequence of 
the low cost structure of what is considered a well-run state electricity company (Eskom) 
and the fact that part of the capital stock has already been depreciated as there has been 
little investment in the sector over the past two decades; hence, the fixed cost component 
of the electricity cost/price in South Africa is very low.   
 
 






















Measured by the percentage of aggregate transmission and distribution losses, 
technical efficiency of the electricity sector is strong. Electric power transmission and 
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distribution losses account for 8 percent of total output in South Africa, which 
outperforms both SSA (19 percent) and upper middle income countries (14 percent). 
Indeed, this aggregate performance is more comparable to the high-income group of 
OECD countries (6 percent).  As a result of an number of supply-side management 
initiatives during the 1990s, Eskom’s generation plant performance improved 
substantially and by early part of this decade several of its technical performance metrics 
(e.g. Unit Capability Factor, Unplanned Capability Loss Factor, and Unplanned 
Automatic Grid Separations per 7000 operating hours) had reached world-class levels (in 
some instances well above the international best quartile). However, this aggregate 
picture must be qualified: for the 30 percent of the population not having access, this 
aggregate technical efficiency does not matter. In addition the increased prevalence of 
power outages in specific communities, even within Johannesburg, associated with the 
poor maintenance and the state of the distribution network under the control of local 
governments further qualifies the technical efficiency of the distribution network.  
 
   
Investment Needs in South Africa’s Electricity Sector 
     
To put the discussion of the sector in the broader context of the infrastructure 
scale up and investment needs, in this section, we briefly present a panel-based projection 
of the large investment needs in the electricity sector for two growth scenario: (i) current 
growth scenario of 3.6 percent per annum and (ii) accelerated growth scenario of 6 
percent per annum.   We base our prediction of the required stocks and flows of 
electricity network infrastructure on an estimated long-run demand model using a 52-
country panel. The panel was limited to low- and middle-income countries, in order not 




The Current Growth Scenario 
 
Our forecasts indicate that the electricity production would grow from 4,815.47 
kwh per capita in 2002 to 6,453.19 kwh per capita in 2010. The average annual forecast 
growth rate for electricity production based on the estimated long-run relation during 
2003-2010 is 3.7 percent. 
 
Using the upper bound cost structure, we predict that total value of the electricity 
generating stock is going to increase from US$ 7.26 billion (R 47.17 billion) in 2002 to 
US$ 9.52 billion (R 61.88 billion at an exchange rate of R6.5/$1) in 2005, and then to 
US$ 14.64 billion (R 95.18 billion) in 2010. Therefore, required average annual 
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where I denotes the electricity infrastructural measure,  P population, YPC per capita real GDP, YS sectoral 
shares in GDP, where we consider agriculture (YAG), manufacturing (YMAN), and services (YSERV), 
and Z denotes a vector of additional explanatory variables.   51
investments in electricity over the period 2003-2010 are of the order of $ 0.52 billion (R 
3.37 billion) or about 0.2% of GDP. It should be noted that this covers only generation, 
excluding transmission and distribution and operations and maintenance expenditures. 
 
How do these investment requirements compare with local estimates of 
investment needs? For electricity, Eskom has estimated average annual investment needs 
in electricity generation, which are approximately of the order of $US1.0 billion, but this 
includes the cost of investment and rehabilitation of transmission and distribution and a 
margin for peak demand (Eskom 2005).  Therefore, our estimates related to electricity 
production only appear broadly in line with the ones prepared by Eskom. It should also 
be noted that while our estimates rely on a robust, multi-country estimate of demand for 
electricity that is used to forecast South Africa’s needs using projected demand variables, 
Eskom’s estimates rely on engineering projections based on South Africa’s time series of 
electricity consumption.  
 
An Accelerated Growth Scenario  
 
The above forecasts are based on the consensus IMF and World Bank predicted 
growth rate of South African GDP in the medium term before the adoption of the 
accelerated and shared growth policy agenda.  The forecasts also include corresponding 
growth rates in the agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors.  
 
We now consider the investment needs in electricity under an alternative, 
accelerated growth scenario, with the average annual GDP growth rate of 6 percent 
identified by the South African government as a policy target. The purpose is to illustrate 
how electricity infrastructure investment requirements would change if a significantly 
accelerated growth scenario were to materialize in the coming years. Such an exercise is 
relevant and timely for two reasons. First, South African economy has been growing at an 
accelerated average annual growth rate of about 4 percent per year since 2004 and the 
short term outlook remains strong. Second, the officially adopted accelerated and shared 
growth initiative of the South African government is aiming for just such 6 percent 
annual growth, albeit suggesting that might only be attainable after 2010. Our illustrative, 
accelerated growth scenario features a more ambitious growth path of 6 percent already 
achieved during the period 2006-2010. As such, our two growth scenarios discussed in 
the paper should cover the range of possible growth paths in this period with associated 
investment requirements in electricity. 
 
The forecast of electricity generating stock under our accelerated scenario now 
indicates that electricity production would grow from 4815.47 kwh per capita in 2002 to 
8179.43 kwh per capita in 2010 (over 25 percent greater than the earlier forecast). The 
required average annual investments over the period 2005-2010 are now of the order of 
$0.96 billion (R6.23 billion), almost double the forecast under the lower, current GDP 
growth rate. 
  
The main implication of considering the accelerated scenario is that it implies 
considerably higher electricity investment requirements to sustain the virtuous circle of   52
productive infrastructure investments and growth. Our estimates indicate that average 
annual investment requirements in electricity production would rise to the order of about 
$1.0 billion, which is close to what Eskom currently projects.  However, it should be 
noted that Eskom’s estimates include transmission, distribution, rehabilitation, and peak 
requirements, probably of the order of at least about $US500 million.  In a nutshell, if the 
accelerated scenario were to materialize in the short term––and South Africa is already 
growing at 5% per annum––it is possible that Eskom’s current investment plans would 
fall well short of investment needs. In that case, Eskom’s scale, timeline, and financing 
structure of its investment scale up will need to be revised. Equally important, there 
would be a need to develop robust estimates of the cost of rehabilitation and maintenance 
of (and institutional requirements) of the distribution network under the control of the 
local governments.     53
IV.  Regional Integration in Southern Africa 
 
  In April 1980, the governments of nine Southern African countries--Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe-
-established the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).   
The SADCC was formed with four principal objectives:
79 
 
•  to reduce Member States’ dependence, particularly, but not only, on apartheid 
South Africa; 
•  to implement programs and projects with national and regional impact; 
•  to mobilize Member States' resources, in the quest for collective self-reliance; and 
•  to secure international understanding and support. 
 
The SADCC was catalytic in cultivating a climate of confidence and trust among 
the member states and provided a clear demonstration of the tangible benefits of regional 
cooperation. However, the SADCC leaders increasingly recognized that even greater 
welfare gains could be realized through deeper forms of regional integration which entail 
the removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions to trade and the harmonization of legal, 
regulatory and institutional frameworks.  Thus they came to realize that although the co-
ordination conference had served them well and had demonstrated the crucial need to 
cooperate in their development efforts, the time had come to give the SADCC a legal and 
more formal status.  And to shift the focus of the organization from co-ordination of 
development projects to a more complex task of integrating the economies of member 
States.   To that end, the Declaration and Treaty establishing the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) was signed on July 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. 
   
The objectives of SADC are to:
80 
 
•  Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the 
standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the 
socially disadvantaged through regional integration; 
•  Evolve common political values, systems and institutions; 
•  Promote and defend peace and security; 
•  Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and 
the interdependence of Member States; 
•  Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programs; 
•  Promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of the 
Region;  
•  Achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the 
environment;  
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•  Strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural 
affinities and links among the people of the Region.  
 
Thus, the ultimate objective of SADC is to build a Region in which there will be a 
high degree of harmonization and rationalization to enable the pooling of resources to 
achieve collective self-reliance in order to improve the living standards of the people of 
the region.  
 
The Southern African Power Pool 
  
Cooperation and trade in the electricity sector among the countries in the Southern 
African region can be traced back to the 1950s.  Most of the electricity exchange took 
place under long-term bilateral contracts between vertically integrated utilities.  These 
contracts were often complex and too difficult to administer.  Power system 
interconnections and cross-border electricity exchanges initially involved around some of 
the major hydropower resource development projects.  These included: 
 
•  The Kariba South hydropower station on the border between Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.  It led to the installation of a 330kV transmission network in the two 
countries and a 330kV line linking the power station to Zambia’s copper mine 
area in the mid-1960s; 
•  The Inga hydopower station in the DRC.
81   It supplies electricity to countries in 
the Southern African region through a 500 kV HVDC linking Inga to Kolwezi 
and then through a 220 kV line linking DRC to Zambia. 
•  Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam which was built in the 1970s.  It 
was mainly intended to supply electricity to South Africa through a HVDC line 
linking the power station to the Apollo sub-station near Johannesburg.  The 
HVDC was damaged during the civil war in 1985, but was rehabilitated in 1997. 
It has also been supplying electricity to Zimbabwe through a 330 kV line.  
    
A drought hit the Southern African region in 1992 which led to severe electricity 
shortages due to reduced hydro generation.  This highlighted the vulnerability of the 
individual countries pursuing a policy of self-sufficiency and emphasized the need for a 
more formal regional power cooperation.  It also highlighted the potential benefits of 
cross-border electricity exchange due to the diverse primary energy endowments of the 
region. The mix of coal-fired stations in South Africa (and in the future in Botswana), 
hydro power on the Zambesi River (Zambia-Zimbabwe border), the Kuene River 
(Angola-Namibia border), and on the Congo river, potential oil- and gas-fired stations in 
Angola, and Gas in Namibia and Mozambique provide diverse primary energy resources 
which could dramatically mitigate the risks to the electricity supply in the region posed 
by the drought and other natural disasters.  For example, during periods of drought, coal-
fired power from South Africa and Botswana can be used to save water in Kariba Lake, 
with the Kariba Power Station being used at such times for peaking purposes only. 
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The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) is the first regional pool to be set up 
outside North America and Western Europe (figure 30).
82  It was formally created in 
1995 when the majority of member countries of the SADC member states signed an 
Inter-Governmental Memorandum of Understanding.  Membership to SAPP is limited to 
the national utilities of the twelve continental members of SADC and it includes: 
Angola’s Empresa Nacional de Electricidade (ENE); Botswana Power Corporation 
(BPC); DRC’s Societe Nationa d’Electricite (SNEL); Lesotho Electricity Supply 
Commission (LEC); Malawi’s Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM); Mozambique’s 
Electricidade de Mocambique (EDM); Namibia Power (NamPower); South Africa’s 
Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom); Swaziland Electricity Board (SEB), Tanzania 
Electircity Supply company (Tanesco); Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO); 
and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA).  
  
Objectives and Roles of SAPP   
  
The objectives of SAPP are to:
83 
 
•  Provide a forum for the development of a world class, robust, safe, efficient, 
reliable and stable interconnected electrical system in the Southern African 
region; 
•  Co-ordinate and enforce common regional standards of quality of supply; 
•  Promote measurement and monitoring of systems’ performance; 
•  Harmonize relationships between member utilities; 
•  Facilitate the development of regional expertise through training programs and 
research; 
•  Increase power accessibility in rural communities; and 
•  Implement strategies in support of sustainable development priorities. 
 
To meet these objectives the members of SAPP sought to define its role as:
84 
 
•  Coordinating the planning and operation of the electric power system among 
member states 
•  Reducing both capital and operating costs through coordination; 
•  Increasing system reliability through emergency support when required; and 
•  Providing a forum for regional solutions to electrical problems. 
 
In February 2000, the SAPP Coordination Center commenced operations in 
Harare, Zimbabwe.  The Center’s primary objectives are to facilitate electricity 
trading in the Southern African region and to provide a focal point for SAPP 
activities, especially through the technical oversight of pool operations.  In particular, 
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the Center is responsible for opening and developing a spot market for electricity in 
the region and for managing the transformation of the pool from a cooperative to a 
competitive pool with an open market for electricity.
85  It monitors the operation of 
the pool, transactions between its members, time correction procedures, inadvertent 
power flows, adherence of members to capacity obligations, availability of 
communications links between the member control centers, and the calculation and 
implementation of reserves.  
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Complementarity of Primary Energy Endowments     
 
  The Southern African region is endowed with diverse energy resources and the 
different endowments of these resources among member states of SADC provide a strong 
rationale for promoting regional electricity trade and ultimately integrating the regional 
electricity markets. 
 
There is a huge and largely undeveloped hydro capacity in Angola, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, and especially the DRC.  These regional hydro resources include the Inga 
Reservoir in the DRC, the Cahora-Bassa Reservoir in Mozambique, and the Kariba dam 
on the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe.  It should be noted that less than 3 percent 
of DRC’s potential hydro capacity is actually exploited (table 7)--this hydroelectric 
power potential is estimated to be as high as 150,000 MW.
86  The Congo River’s huge 
potential for hydroelectric power could play an important role in providing power for the 
region. 
 
The South African region has an abundance of coal (over 20 percent of the 
world’s recoverable reserves), primarily located in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (table 7).  South Africa’s 
recoverable reserves are estimated at 55 billion short tons. Botswana has huge potential 
reserves of over 210 billion short tons.  Its Mmamabula coal mine has the potential to 
become an important energy source for the entire region.  The planned Mmamabula 
power plant is expected to have between 2,400 and 3,600 megawatt capacity.
87  Moatize 
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Box  4  The Benefits of an integrated regional electricity market 
  
Integration of electricity markets can yield significant benefits by: 
 
•  exploiting complementarities and comparative advantages in primary energy endowments and 
thus facilitating more efficient utilization of existing generating resources and giving access to 
lower-cost supplies; 
•  reducing supply risks through the provision of multiple links between system loads and cross-
country generating resources; 
•  sharing generation reserve margins among several utilities or countries; 
•  reducing environmental degradation; 
•  providing the basis for actual and potential competition, and hence increased efficiency, in 
national markets that are otherwise too small to permit significant competitive entry; 
•  exploiting economies of scale through large regional projects; reducing investment requirements 
through sharing of reserve capacity; 
•  facilitating benchmarking of costs, managerial efficiency, and operational practices; 
•  and by advancing domestic policy reform, enhancing credibility, and helping countries 
overcome policy commitment problems and technical capacity constraints.   
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in northwestern Mozambique is considered to be the largest unexplored coal province in 
the world with an estimated 2.4 billion tons of reserves.  In 2003, regional coal 
production reached 269 million short tons (Mmst), of which South Africa produced 




Table 7  Hydro and coal resources in the Southern African Region 
 
Installed Capacity  Potential Capacity Proven Estimated
Angola 980 18,267 n.a. n.a.
Botswana n.a. n.a. 32,112 212,000
DRC 2,416 97,584 n.a. n.a.
Lesotho 75 3,000 n.a. n.a.
Malawi 304 900 22 1,000
Mozambique 2,184 6,398 n.a. 3,000
Namibia 240 520 350 n.a.
South Africa 668 n.a. 55,000 n.a.
Swaziland 40 440 208 1,000
Tanzania 630 4,700 304 1,200
Zambia 1,670 6,683 30 1,000
Zimbabwe 750 7,200 11,000 26,625
Total 10,024 145,692 99,026 245,825





  Natural gas continues to grow in importance and is a resource that exists 
variously throughout the region.  Significant reserves are located in Angola (1 Tcf), DRC 
(35 Bcf), Mozambique (4.5 Tcf), Namibia (2.2 Tcf), South Africa (1 Bcf) and Tanzania 
(800 Bcf).  Mozambique is likely to become a major producer of gas in the region in the 
medium term.  Its three offshore gas fields Pande, Temane, and Buzi have estimated 
recoverable reserves in the order of 2.1 Tcf, 1.0 Tcf, and 10Bcf  respectively.  Actual gas 
production was limited to an insignificant amount from the Pande field which supplied 
some local villages.
90  In 2000, the National Hydrocarbon Company (ENH) of 
Mozambique and the South African company Sasol Petroleum International signed an 
agreement on the joint development of the Pande and Temane natural gas fields and on a 
gas pipeline to transport gas from these fields to the Gauteng area in South Africa.  The 
865 km pipeline opened in July 2004 and brought South Africa a step closer to 
diversifying its energy sources.
91   Namibia is another potentially major producer of 
natural gas.  The Kudu gas field is located on the Namibian continental shelf offshore of 
southern Namibia (170 km from Oranjemund) in a water depth of 170 metres. A gas-in-
place of 1.3 trillion cubic feet has been proven to 90% confidence level, which is 
                                                 
88 Energy Information Administration. 2005. The Southern African Development Community.  Country 
Analysis Brief. 
89 Mathangwane, F. 2005.  “Facilitating Access to Power in SADC and Ensuring the Region’s Bright 
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sufficient to operate an 800 MW nominal capacity combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) 
power station for a period of 22 years on base load. Probable gas-in-place volumes at a 
confidence level of 50% are sufficient to operate a 1,600 MW CCGT plant for at least 25 
years. 
 
The Scope for Regional Integrated Resource Planning  
 
The scope for regional development and for optimizing the electricity system 
from a regional perspective is enormous.  And the creation of SAPP clearly marked an 
important step toward realizing the benefits of such regional electricity planning. 
 
South Africa’s Eskom--which accounts for over 80 percent of generation in the 
region—relies heavily on expensive (at least relative to hydro) and polluting thermal 
power from domestic coal. Trading arrangements between South Africa and the hydro-
rich northern countries could be mutually beneficial, providing cheaper electricity for the 
former and revenue boosting for the latter.  Obvious examples for regional cooperation 
would include: the hydroelectric potential of the DRC, Mozambique, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe; the Pande, Temane and Kundu fields in Mozambique and Namibia; and the 
oil industry and hydroelectric potential of Angola. 
 
The magnitude of potential gains from increased regional cooperation and trade is 
substantial.  An important attribute of electricity trade is the improved reliability of 
supply, particularly when relying on hydro power that is vulnerable to drought.  In the 
case of Zimbabwe, for example, the 1992 draught caused electricity shortages in 1993 
that cost the country’s economy US$ 435 in lost export earnings--nearly 10 percent of its 
GDP.
92   
 
A 1993 joint study by SADC and the World Bank estimated that optimal use of 
regional resources and installations could provide savings of US$ 1.6 billion over 10 
years in comparison with a scenario under which each country would pursue its power 
development plans separately.
93  It should be noted that South Africa, which accounts for 
the bulk of the power produced in the region, was not included in that study.  Thus, the 
potential gains available now through South Africa’s participation in regional planning 
are likely to be significantly higher.       
  
Recent studies utilizing the optimization model RIEP (Regional Integrated 
Electricity Planning) developed at the University of Stuttgart quantified the benefits of 
regional co-operation in Southern Africa to savings of at least US$2.2 billion or 5 percent 
of the expected total costs over a period of 20 years.  Under a scenario of high electricity 
demand growth, savings of over US$ 4 billion could be realized through regional 
planning.  Approximately 40 percent of the estimated savings would result from lower 
investment costs and 60 percent from lower operating costs.  The potential economic and 
social benefits of co-operation become even larger when environmental factors are 
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explicitly taken into account in regional planning.  Including external costs of US$ 4 to 
15 per ton of CO2 would lead to changes in investment patterns which in turn would 
reduce carbon emissions by 22 to 55 percent by the year 2015.  Under that scenario, the 
hydro potential of the northern sub-region would be utilized rather than the new fossil 
power plant of South Africa.
94 
  
In 2001, a 20-year generation and transmission expansion plan was completed for the 
Southern African region.  The coordinated plans required the expenditure of $US 8 
billion, while the sum of the individual utility expansion plans required US$ 11 billion.  




However, despite the substantial potential economic benefits of regional co-operation, 
and the ambitious policy pronouncements by the national leaders of SADC, the actual 
electricity trade flows in the region have been fairly modest so far.  There are several 
factors that have inhibited the effective integration of electricity markets and electricity 
trading in the Southern African region. 
 
Prerequisites for Successful Integration of Electricity Systems   
 
The development of an effective regional electricity market requires: 
 
•  Sector unbundling.  Both public and private vertically-integrated utilities 
generally have strong incentives for self-dealing and thus a continuing high 
degree of vertical integration could hinder the interchange of power and the extent 
of cross-border competition that could emerge.  Some form of unbundling is 
necessary in order to avoid the possibility, for example, of network constraints 
being used as an excuse by vertically integrated utilities (with a general tendency 
for self-preference towards their own generating units) to exclude competitors and 
effectively erect barriers to the free cross-border flow of electricity.
96 
•  High-capacity intersystem tie lines.   For the benefits of regional coordination and 
energy transfers to obtain there is a need for high-capacity transmission links.  
These intersystem tie lines also contribute to improved regional system stability 
and reliability. 
•  Open access to transmission.  Every country should have transparent, objective 
and non-discriminatory rules making its transmission facilities available to 
regional electricity entities on a “fair and equal basis”.  The publication of 
technical rules for connection, and a clear definition of equal treatment and non-
discrimination are crucial.  There is also a need for effective dispute resolution 
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process to deal with cases of refusal or suspension of access.  These requirements 
should be ideally embedded in SAPP’s Grid Code rules. 
•  Free choice of supplier.  Purchases and sales should be non-discriminatory.  Any 
restrictions to regional power transactions should be based only on explicitly 
agreed-upon quality and safety standards with buyers and sellers paying for the 
losses and congestion they create in the system. 
•  Harmonization of regulation and market structures.  Disparities of regulatory 
treatment across borders can introduce distortions that hinder both electricity trade 
and the aggregate flows of investment to the sector on regional basis.  Similarly, 
market opening and restructuring must have a parallel development (reciprocity) 
across countries.  Otherwise, significant differences in market structures (e.g. in 
vertical structure and the type of ownership) could hinder cross-border trade.   
Regulatory harmonization, the elimination of trade-distorting inefficient national 
regulations, and regulatory cooperation to overcome domestic constraints on 
regulatory capacity are essential components of regional economic integration. 
•  Tariff rebalancing.  When there are significant cross-subsidies embedded in the 
structure of tariffs, regional trading that may appear to be economically 
advantageous may actually be inefficient.  Even suppliers with inefficiently high 
costs may find exporting profitable in reaction to pricing that has the mandate of 
providing a flow of subsidies. 
•  Harmonization of administrative procedures.  National permissions, concession 
and approval procedures related to national or cross-border infrastructure should 
be harmonized.  When administrative procedures vary significantly across 
countries, it is very difficult to assess and implement cross-border projects. 
 
Structural Weaknesses of Bilateral Electricity Exchange in SAPP 
  
Cross-border electricity trade in the Southern African region has been mostly in 
the form of bilateral agreements between vertically-integrated state-owned utilities, 
simultaneously performing the three primary functions of generation, transmission and 
distribution.  Inter-utility trading is dominated by Eskom both as an electricity exporter 
and importer, HCB as an energy exporter, and ZESA as an energy importer (table 8). 
 
Eskom exports power to Botswana (BPC), Mozambique (EDM), Zimbabwe (ZESA), 
Namibia (NamPower), Lesotho (LEC), Swaziland (SEB) and, since 2002, Zambia.   
Exports to Mozambique increased substantially since 2000—from 68 GWh in 1999, 1331 
GWh in 2000, and 3899 GWh in 2001 to 8076 GWh and 10,108 GWh in 2004 and 2005 
respectively (table 9).  This was primarily due to electricity supplied to the Mozal 
Aluminum Smelter in Maputo.  Exports to Zimbabwe, on the other hand, have been 
declining since 1999 because of ZESA’s imports from Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa 
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Table 8  Current SAPP bilateral power trading agreements 
 
 
   Source: SAPP Coordination Center 
  
 
   Table 9  Eskom’s exports to neighboring utilities (GWh, 1995-2005) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BPC 340 685 748 689 934 986 1183 1124 1390 1699 2111
EDM 600 596 680 385 68 1331 3899 3907 5875 8076 10108
ZESA 154 2267 2790 1521 1564 788 371 298 793 532 598
Others(*) 1892 2006 2221 1498 1318 767 1257 1627 2115 2647 3191
All 2986 5554 6439 4093 3884 3872 6710 6956 10173 12954 16008  
 
Source: Eskom Annual Report (various years). 
(*) Others include NamPower, LEC, SEB, ZESCO, and sales to the Short-term energy market. 
Note: Figures for 2005 refer to the 15-month period between January 2004 and March 2005. 
 
The main weakness of the current system of electricity exchange in SAPP is not 
because it is dominated by long-term bilateral agreements rather than a real-time spot 
market.  It is primarily due to the fact that the bilateral exchanges are undertaken by state-
owned, vertically-integrated utilities. 
  
Under-investment, in large part caused by under-pricing has been one of the key 
explanatory factors for the deteriorating performance of state-owned electricity systems 
throughout the world.  For almost two decades, most of the state-owned utilities in SAPP 
have not made any new major investments in power generation expansion despite the rise 
in power demand.  This is true of both the hydro-based utilities (which continued to rely 
on hydropower stations commissioned during the 1950s and 1960s) as well as the 
region’s dominant thermal-based utility, Eskom.  As a result, in recent years some of 
these utilities have been facing major difficulties in fulfilling their contractual obligations 
for sustainable electricity supply to their importing partners.   63
Box 5  Koeberg Repairs Put Namibia in Energy Crunch 
 
ESKOM’s decision to shut down its Koeberg power plant for maintenance poses a major power 
threat to Namibia and has steadily pushed up supply costs. 
“I don’t want to say we are in a crisis, but there’s a major challenge facing us,” NamPower MD 
Leake Hangala says. 
Namibia could be forced to load-shed in future to deal with the decision to shut down Koeberg. 
Already one unit has been out of action since the end of last year and the second unit will shut down 
next month for repairs. 
This means NamPower will have to alternate the areas that will have to go without power during 
peak hours.  Namibia’s power demand is about 500 MW. 
 
Source: Business Day (Johannesburg), February 10, 2006.  
  
The state-owned utilities involved in the bilateral power exchanges continued to 
plan and execute their capacity expansion on the basis of national sufficiency rather than 
a regional perspective.  Thus, they did not invest in new capacity that was sufficient to 
both meet the growing domestic demand and their contractual obligations.  The 
generation capacity constraints that resulted in the exporting countries ultimately 
compromised the reliability and security of regional supply.  The inadequacy of regional 
generating capacity has become more serious with the tightening of the demand/supply 
balance in South Africa (box 5). 
 
    Electricity sector reforms, including increased private sector participation and 
competitive restructuring (unbundling) could make a significant contribution towards 
reducing the inadequacy of regional generation capacity. The SAPP member countries 
are at different albeit mostly early stages of restructuring their electricity systems (table 
10).  Their utilities are still predominantly vertically integrated and state-owned.  Because  
 
of their financial, technical, and managerial resources, private entities could have a 
distinct comparative advantage relative to the monolithic, state-owned (and frequently 
cash-strapped) utilities in meeting the increasing power demands of the SADC 
economies.  Moreover, the needed rebalancing of the roles of the public and private 
sectors in the region’s electricity systems is hindered by the continuing high degrees of 
vertical integration of the regional utilities.  Private entities will be reluctant to enter and 
sink substantial amounts of money in the regional electricity markets if the essential 
electricity facilities (e.g. transmission) are controlled by their competitors in the provision 
of downstream services.  Competitive neutrality and a level-playing-field, important 
preconditions for entry and private investment, are likely to be violated in the eyes of 
potential investors when the regional electricity markets are dominated by public utilities 
that are considered to be too important for the respective national economies and the 
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Table 10  Status of power sector reforms in SAPP member countries 
 
 
Source: SAPP Annual Report 2004. 
 
  Another structural issue that might have significant implications for introducing 
competition in SAPP is the extent to which the regional electricity market is dominated 
by Eskom.  In 2005, Eskom accounted for 83 percent of the installed capacity and 85 
percent of electricity sales of SAPP member countries (table 11).  These levels of 
dominance raise legitimate concerns about monopolization.  Thus decisions about the 
horizontal and vertical structure of Eskom are like to have profound implications for the 
future competitive developments in the regional electricity market as well as the progress 
towards effective regional integration.  In South Africa today pressing domestic policy 
concerns about looming power shortages seem to far outweigh any regionalization 
initiatives--despite the fact that regional cooperation could be very effective in resolving 
Eskom’s inadequate generation capacity.  On the other hand, the smaller countries might 
tend to view regional integration as a further step towards solidifying Eskom’s regional 
market dominance.  Thus neither the large nor the small countries of the region face the 
proper incentives to accelerate regional electricity integration.  
 
Whenever utilities produce at different costs, it may be economical for them to 
agree to trade.  However, despite the potential gains from electricity trade, the wide 
differential in performance between Eskom and the other SAPP utilities (figure 31) may 
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Figure 31  Performance of SAPP utilities 
 
 
Source: SAPP Annual Report 2006. 
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V.  International Policy Developments 
 
    After decades of structural immobility in the electricity industry, governments are 
allowing market forces to play a role in generation and supply. Structural change 
accelerated over the past decade and is now a global phenomenon. Although only a 
handful of countries have achieved substantive market liberalization, almost all have felt 
considerable domestic and international pressure to reform their electricity systems.
97 
 
Contentious Issues and Alleged Myths 
 
  What advice can we give to a country whose electricity supply industry is still in 
public ownership, and where there is a genuine public debate about and commitment 
reform? 
  The decision to privatize state-owned electricity assets naturally raises a series of 
questions about the optimal organizational approach to transferring assets to private owners. 
Should all asset types, whether generation plants, high voltage and distribution networks, be 
privatized or should private ownership be limited to the sectors where competitive markets 
can be feasibly implemented?   And, if markets are small, should competition be attempted?  
In the former case, what is the optimal degree of vertical integration between privately-
owned generation, transmission and distribution activities, bearing in mind that investments 
or operational decisions in one market segment can have important consequences for 
operational efficiency in other segments?  Similarly, given the need for investment and real-
time operational coordination between, as well as, within geographic regions, what is the 
optimal level of horizontal fragmentation?  
  
“Optimal” Restructuring Options and Success of Reform 
     
  Most of the reform programs in developing economies have sought to promote 
private ownership and investment, and hence to reduce the dominance of the state-owned 
vertically integrated enterprise—in the past, the almost universal option for organizing the 
electricity sector.  Although increased private participation was the common denominator, 
there has been substantial variability in the nature of these reforms.  Some countries have 
invited private investment in the generation sector only, financed by long-term supply 
contracts to state-owned utilities (e.g. China, India, Indonesia, Mexico); some have 
vertically separated the industry but only privatized part of the industry (e.g. Colombia, El 
Salvador, Kazakstan, New Zealand); while others have privatized the entire industry and 
additionally created competitive generation markets (e.g. Argentina, Chile, U.K.). 
  
  The degree of private sector interest, however, has been markedly mixed across 
countries and regions. There have been some notable successes in attracting significant 
levels of private investment in all sectors of the industry, (e.g., Argentina, Australia, El 
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Salvador, the U.K.). On the other hand, private investors have shown little interest in 
purchasing state-owned enterprises or in financing de novo infrastructure assets in countries 
such as Mexico, Turkey or the Ukraine, to name but a few. Indeed some countries, including 
Hungary and Venezuela, have had to postpone planned privatization programs due to lack of 
investor interest.  Thus, in these countries, despite substantial state encouragement, 
governments have been unable to reverse sustained periods of under-funding in state 
ownership with large inflows of private capital. 
  
As a consequence of the mixed experiences, and of the variety of alternative 
approaches undertaken, a debate has emerged on the design of “optimal” restructuring 
policies. Much of this debate has focused on classic industrial organization issues, such as 
the optimal degree of vertical integration between transmission, distribution and generation 
functions, the extent of horizontal fragmentation, the design of competitive generation 
markets and so on.  Although policy-makers and government advisors have paid 
considerable attention to these and other structural issues in the development of reform 
programs, there is no sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that one particular 
structural configuration of a fully or partially privatized electricity industry is more 
conducive for long-term private investment than another. 
 
  The absence of a clear relationship between the structural nature of industry 
reforms and the success in encouraging private investment is not surprising since an 
assessment of the regulatory environment is excluded. An important but frequently 
implicit assumption in the debate on optimal restructuring policies is that the supporting 
regulatory institutions have a neutral impact on the players’ behavior. In practice, 
however, the design of the regulatory framework has a critical effect on investor’s 
incentives to make long-term asset commitments. The empirical pattern that does emerge 
from a close analysis is that the success of restructuring reforms is associated with the 
degree to which regulatory regimes provide a credible commitment to asset owners to 
resolve disputes in an independent manner and to ultimately provide a fair return on their 
investments. 
 
In spite of the heated debate among advocates of particular reform policies, the 
experience of various countries suggests that no single organizational structure obviously 
trumps another.  Thus, there is some controversy regarding the “optimal” structural 
approach.  In fact, it is claimed that what Levy and Spiller (1996) call the sector’s 
“regulatory governance” regime is more important for attracting long-term private 
investment than the specific choice of industrial structure.  The proponents of this view 
argue that the key to successful reforms is first to establish a credible regulatory 
environment, and only then to ponder on refinements of the chosen organizational 
structure for the industry. 
 
Vertical Separation and Investment 
 
It is frequently argued that due to large economies of coordination, vertical 
separation of transmission and generation will lead to inefficient investments. 
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Transmission networks play a critical role in ensuring a low cost and reliable 
supply of electricity. In the absence of transmission capacity constraints, electricity 
generated in one region is able to flow to other regions where local generation supplies 
are either insufficient to meet demand, for example during peak periods, or else are 
relatively costly compared to imports. The construction of additional transmission 
infrastructure can therefore serve as a partial substitute for building extra generation 
capacity when demand and supply imbalances are uneven across regions. For this reason, 
vertical integration between transmission and generation functions is sometimes seen as 
an efficient organizational structure, particularly when the size of the market is small. A 
vertically integrated owner faces incentives to invest in generation and/or transmission 
assets in a manner that minimizes combined generation and transmission costs, whereas 
under separate ownership contracting difficulties may prevent such an outcome, 
potentially leading to under-investment. 
 
While efficiency rationales have thus led to proposals for vertically integrated, 
horizontally concentrated industry structures, concerns about the exercise of market 
power on the other hand have led to opposing recommendations. Difficulties in setting 
and regulating efficient transmission charges, so it is argued, enable vertically integrated 
suppliers to devise charging structures that favor their own generation plants over those 
of competitors in dispatch decisions. By separating the ownership of transmission and 
generation assets, the incentives for transmission owners to discriminate against 
particular generation companies are reduced, thereby encouraging efficient entry into the 
generation sector. 
 
The policy of vertically integrating transmission and generation ownership is 
therefore no simple panacea for inducing efficient levels of investment electricity 
markets.  Given the conflicting tensions inherent in vertical integration and vertical 
separation policies, the policy challenge is rather to design institutions that satisfactorily 
balance efficiency and market power concerns. 
 
For the same reasons motivating vertical integration proposals, it has been argued 
that since efficient investment in national transmission networks also requires 
coordination  among  operators in various regions, the optimal degree of horizontal 
fragmentation in transmission should be low. Dynamic concerns again contradict 
efficiency-driven policy recommendations.  Generation companies require access to 
transmission networks in order to compete effectively against rival generation companies.  
When transmission is organized as a monopoly franchise, implying that generation 
companies are not free to invest in their own transmission assets, transmission owners are 
in a position to “hold up” generators through a variety of means.  Monopoly transmission 
owners have an incentive to extract rents from generation companies by manipulating 
access to the network; for example, by using uncontracted network upgrades or 
maintenance schedules as bargaining points.  A natural solution to this problem is to 
remove ownership restrictions in the transmission sector to allow generation firms to 
invest in their own competing transmission assets, thereby creating an a priori argument 
for horizontal fragmentation. 
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Recognizing the plethora of conflicting tensions under private ownership, still 
others (in particular socialist European governments) have argued that the best policy is 
in fact to retain transmission networks under public ownership. An important assumption 
underpinning this proposal is that the government has less incentive to hold-up private 
generators than a private owner of the transmission network.  However, the highly 
politicized nature of electricity consumption in all countries makes the industry especially 
susceptible to government control, irrespective of the ownership structure.  Indeed, under 
public transmission ownership, the government may find it easier to hold-up private 
generation firms since it has direct control over day-to-day managerial decisions than in 
the private ownership case where the government may have to pressure a regulatory 
agency to implement its preferred policy.  Thus, while public ownership may allay 
concerns over the exercise of private market power in transmission it also exposes 
generation firms to greater political hazards. 
 
Economies of scale in generation limit the potential for competition to relatively 
small markets. In addition to the organization of transmission, governments have several 
options for reform in the generation sector. Chief among these is the decision to create a 
competitive wholesale generation market where sellers bid against each other to supply 
electricity on a continuous basis, with prices determined by a market-making mechanism. 
Following the lead of Argentina in the 1980s, a number of jurisdictions have made 
competitive generation markets a central component of privatization and restructuring 
programs (e.g. Australia, California, Chile, Finland, Norway, Sweden, U.K., Ukraine). 
Although the introduction of wholesale markets is generally perceived as being a 
desirable policy goal, questions have been raised about the feasibility of implementing 
similar reforms in smaller countries where, it is argued, only a small number of 
generation companies can be supported, leading to an oligopolistic situation (see Table 
2). Competitive markets have been established, however, in several small countries where 
installed capacity is a small fraction of that in larger wholesale markets, such as Bolivia, 
El Salvador and Guatemala.
98 Similarly, there have been disastrous results in some large 
countries; in the Ukraine, for instance, repeated attempts by the government and 
international aid agencies to breathe life into the spot generation market have failed since 
1996, and most generation trades are now arranged on an ad hoc bilateral basis among 
generators and distributors or final consumers.
99 Legal uncertainties about the status of 
contracts and private property in the Ukraine, as well as strong concerns over 
bureaucratic corruption,
100 have undermined the incentives for entrants to invest in new, 
more efficient generation capacity, to write long-term contracts and to engage in the spot 
market. The experience of the Ukraine suggests that, rather than market size, the main 
constraint on the feasibility of wholesale markets to operate is the ability of new 
generation companies to enter the market, access transmission resources on a non-
discriminatory basis and enter into enforceable contracts with new or existing buyers . 
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Large economies of scale in distribution imply that too much fragmentation 
of distribution facilities will lead to high distribution costs.   
 
Within the distribution sector, perceptions about the degree of scale economies 
have also led to prescriptions for the optimal level of geographic fragmentation for 
inducing private sector investment. A common concern is that while horizontal 
fragmentation of the distribution sector creates regulatory benefits – in that a larger 
number of companies facilitates “yardstick” regulation – it may also increase distribution 
costs and encourage inefficient investment decisions if economies of scale are ignored.  
For this reason, low levels of fragmentation are frequently prescribed in reform programs.  
 
The hypothesized relationship between geographic fragmentation and distribution 
costs and investment is questionable, however, on several grounds.  First, economies of 
scale in distribution are driven by the density of customers, implying that optimal 
geographic footprints can be very small, and that the degree of fragmentation can be quite 
large.  Thus, in Norway, distribution activities are divided among more than 240 firms 
and in New Zealand among more than 40.  Secondly, the ability to induce efficient levels 
of distribution investment depends on private sector expectations about future regulated 
rates of return and the possibility that once assets have been put in place attempts will be 
made by political actions to expropriate their rent streams.  
  
  Sequencing strategies 
 
  One of the first questions to address is whether there is a logical sequence of 
reforms, and whether it is costly to undertake reforms in the wrong order.  It is a good 
principle that any reform addresses the most important problems first, and that the early 
reforms should if possible create a momentum for future desirable reforms, while 
minimizing the risks of failure and policy reversal.  Reversible and less risky reforms can be 
undertaken more readily than irreversible (or costly to reverse) and more risky reforms.  
Some irreversible reforms may be necessary to commit the country to future desirable 
changes, and privatization is often argued to be one such reform.  Nevertheless, the principle 
that irreversible reforms require more careful design and assessment than reversible reforms 
holds good.   
  
  There is growing evidence on what constitute robust, self-sustaining and desirable 
reform strategies, and what strategies are risky and may lead to undesirable outcomes. 
Privatization itself is only reversible at high external cost (loss of reputation for foreign 
investment).  Imperfectly designed privatization can complicate subsequent reforms. 
Similarly, it is often hard or costly to reverse structural choices, such as the degree of 
vertical and horizontal integration. 
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VI.  Recent Electricity Reforms in South Africa 
The electricity sector in South Africa has undergone a number of important policy 
reforms in recent years.  There are several factors that contributed to these policy 
changes.  Before 1994, the main goal of public policy in the sector was to secure 
adequate and low-priced electricity supply for the industrial, mining, agricultural, 
transportation, and commercial sectors, as well as for mid- and high-income households.  
Energy policy was based on the principle of “separate development” and was 
fundamentally oriented to providing services on the basis of race.  No national policy 
existed to promote wider electricity access despite the extensive over-investment in 
generating capacity.  The government that came to power after the first democratic 
elections in 1994 was determined to redress the injustices of apartheid and to 
substantially expand access to electricity services by poor black urban and rural 
households.  An indispensable precondition to the government’s accelerated 
electrification program was the reorganization of the highly fragmented local government 
structure that was part of apartheid’s legacy.  Most of these local governments suffered 
from severe financing problems that greatly limited their ability to maintain and expand 




While important political changes were taking place in South Africa in the early- 
and mid-1990s, abundant evidence was emerging at the same time from many developing 
countries that the state-owned enterprises in core sectors of their economies, like 
infrastructure, were suffering from serious performance problems
102.  An important 
element of the new government’s economic agenda was the adoption of policies that 
sought to reorganize and reform the country’s state-owned enterprises in order to improve 
their efficiency and performance.  It was widely accepted that Eskom was better managed 
and exhibited superior performance in comparison to other state-owned enterprises.  Still, 
the government’s broad efforts aimed at reforming the state-owned enterprises provided 
the needed impetus for power sector reforms. 
  
Another reform driver emerged from the government’s comprehensive 
reassessment of its energy policy during the mid- to late-1990s.  The analysis that 
supported the formulation of the new energy policy highlighted the importance of 
avoiding Eskom’s past mistakes related to its excessive investment in generating 
capacity.  This naturally focused attention on the potentially important relationship 
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between market structure and investment efficiency and raised doubts as to whether 
Eskom should be entrusted with the planning and undertaking of all future generating 
capacity expansion.    
 
The White Paper on Energy 
 
The White Paper was written so as to clarify government policy regarding the supply 
and consumption of energy. The policy sought to strengthen existing energy systems in 
certain areas, called for the development of underdeveloped systems and demonstrated a 
resolve to bring about extensive change in a number of areas. It addressed international 
trade and co-operation, capacity building, and the collection of adequate information. The 
document was comprehensive, addressing all elements of the energy sector. 
 
The process leading to the formulation of the White Paper entailed extensive and 
transparent consultations that consisted of the following steps: 
 
•  the release of an Energy Policy Discussion Document to interested parties for 
study and written comment; 
•  a workshop with the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mineral and Energy 
Affairs; 
•  ad hoc briefing sessions for major stakeholder groups in the energy sector; 
•  an open workshop on the small-scale use of energy, mainly for households, where 
interested persons and representatives from local communities, both urban and 
rural, participated; 
•  a workshop on energy governance and the process of energy policy formulation, 
to which senior representatives of the energy industry, large and small energy 
consumer groups and government departments at national and provincial level, 
were invited; 
•  an open National Energy Policy Summit at which the various policy options were 
debated in detail.    
 
The National Energy Policy Summit led to a consensus on energy sector goals.  A 
draft paper was prepared in June 1996 but it became public only in July 1998 because of 
administrative and political reasons.  After public hearings that were held under the 
auspices of the Parliamentary Portofolio Committee, the final paper was published at the 
end of 1998. 
 
The policy options identified in the White Paper indicated the potential to move 
boldly from the status quo to a new, clear vision and policy framework for the energy 
sector in South Africa. Gone were the exclusive concerns of fuel security and self-
sufficiency held by an apartheid government beleaguered with international sanctions. 
The advent of democratic government and the re-acceptance of South Africa by the 
international community offered the opportunity for a radical shift in energy policy. 
Energy policy was to align itself with the new social and economic policies of the 
Government of National Unity aimed at reconstruction and development. In addition it   73
was taking into account important international trends which were placing greater 
emphasis on competitiveness, efficiency and environmental sustainability. 
 
The White Paper emphasized the following policy objectives: 
 
•  increasing access to affordable energy services; 
•  improving energy governance—clarification of the relative roles and functions of 
various energy institutions within the context of accountability, transparency and 
inclusive membership, particularly participation by the previously disadvantaged; 
•  stimulating economic development—encouragement of competition within 
energy markets; 
•  managing energy-related environmental and health effects—promotion of access 
to basic energy services for poor households while reducing negative health 
impacts arising from energy activities; 
•  securing supply through diversity—increased opportunities for energy trade, 
particularly within the Southern African region, and diversity of both supply 
sources and primary energy carriers.
103 
  
Restructuring the Electricity Distribution System  
  
  The organizational architecture of the electricity distribution industry (EDI) was 
the subject of considerable debate for several years in numerous studies, a stakeholder 
forum, and government committees, including the National Electricity Forum (NELF), 
the Electricity Working Group (EWG), and the Electricity Restructuring 
Interdepartmental Committee  (ERIC).  The task for developing the government’s 
position on the issue was given to ERIC which completed its report in 1996.  On the basis 
of the ERIC Report, the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) submitted a 
memorandum to the Cabinet in 1997 that recommended: 
 
•  the electricity distribution industry should be consolidated into the maximum 
number of financially viable and independent regional electricity distributors; 
•  cost-reflective tariffs, an electrification levy, and a capped tax for the funding of 
municipal service should be introduced. 
 
In June 1999 the cabinet agreed to rationalize the distribution businesses of 
municipalities and Eskom into six Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs--figure 32.  
The Cabinet also decreed the creation of the Electricity Distribution Industry 
Restructuring Committee (EDIRC) to oversee the transformation of EDI.
104  And it 
appointed Price WarehouseCoopers (PwC) as technical advisors.  The Government made 
a serious effort to engage all key stakeholders in the process.  For this, PwC organized 
several   workshops.  EDIRC produced a Blueprint for EDI Reform.  In January 2001, the 
Cabinet adopted EDIRC’s recommendation to rationalize the EDI into six REDs.  In 
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March 2003, EDI Holdings (Pty) Ltd was incorporated with a sole purpose of executing 
the government's strategic objectives of restructuring the EDI as per the 
recommendations of the Blueprint for EDI Reform (2001).  
 
Figure 32  RED boundaries with anchor metros 
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A large number of municipalities have been deriving significant surplus income from 
their municipal electricity undertakings.  Naturally, these local authorities have been 
ambivalent or outright hostile to the restructuring of EDI because it would imply the loss 
of an important source of their revenue.  Similarly, the country’s political forces have 
been divided on the issue.  The country’s political leadership has for a long time 
recognized the urgency and importance of resolving the problems of electricity 
distribution.  However, those involved at the local government level have been less than 
enthusiastic about EDI restructuring because of they feared that it would diminish their 
influence. 
 
As a result, progress towards transforming the fragmented electricity distribution 
businesses into six financially viable and sustainable REDs has been painfully slow. 
During the year 2004/5, the EDI restructuring process entered a qualitatively new and 
important stage when President Thabo Mbeki announced in his State of the Nation 
Address on 21st May 2004, that: "The first Regional Electricity Distributor will be ready 
to operate by June 2005 and the whole process of the establishment of these structures 
will be completed by January 2007."  The President’s statement signified the 
government’s commitment to pursue the EDI restructuring process, and perhaps even   75
more importantly, to accelerate it such that it meets the government’s socio-economic 
development imperatives as well as its program of action.
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The first RED was indeed established in 2005, but only on paper.  The restructuring 
of EDI is still very much work in progress. 
 
The National Electricity Regulator (NER) 
 
The NER was established on April 1, 1995 as the successor to the Electricity Control 
Board.  It derived its statutory authority from the Electricity Act of 1987 as amended by 
the Electricity Amendment Acts of 1994 and 1995.  The NER issued licenses and 
regulated all aspects of generation, transmission, distribution, and retail electricity 
activities in South Africa.  Its key functions included: 
 
•  issuance of licenses for generation, transmission, distribution and retail of 
electricity; 
•  determination of electricity prices; 
•  settling disputes; advising the Minister of Minerals and Energy on matters 
pertaining to the electricity supply industry. 
 
NER’s consisted of a part-time Board whose membership included a chairperson, a 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and seven other members.  Its board members were 
appointed by the Minister of Minerals and Energy but once appointed they were to act 
independently and report to Parliament. 
 
The NER was recently succeeded by the National Energy Regulator (NERSA), the 
regulatory authority established in terms of the National Energy Regulator Act, 2004 (Act 
No. 40 of 2004) with the mandate to undertake the functions of the Gas Regulator as set 
out in the Gas Act of 2001, the Petroleum Pipelines Regulatory Authority as set out in the 
Petroleum Pipelines Act of 2003 and the National Electricity Regulator as set out in the 
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VII.  An Agenda for Policy Action 
  
A fundamental tenet of this report is that the role of government in relation to 
market behavior in the electricity industry should be explicitly based on the underlying 
economic characteristics of the industry, the technological conditions of its production, 
and the nature of market demands for the industry’s products. 
 
The Case for Radical Electricity Restructuring in South Africa Does Not 
Appear to Be Very Compelling...  
   
In most developing countries the primary push for electricity (and more broadly 
infrastructure) privatization came from the debt and fiscal crises of the early 1980s. 
Another major impetus came from the extraordinarily weak performance of the electricity 
sector in these countries relative to the advanced industrial countries.  Similar reasons 
motivated reforms in transition economies starting in the early 1990s.  Heavy debt 
burdens forced many countries to make fiscal adjustments that hit public investment in 
infrastructure, including electricity, especially hard. 
 
Privatization was also spurred by the intolerable damage caused by 
mismanagement of public electric utilities. Most such entities pursued multiple, poorly 
defined, conflicting objectives, with managers often appointed based on their political 
loyalty, not competence. Investment funds were frequently squandered on poor projects. 
Moreover, price controls were imposed without regard for their performance 
implications, subjecting enterprises to financial distress and impairing their ability to 
mobilize investments and provide reliable services.  Electricity blackouts became one of 
the defining characteristics of developing countries. 
 
  In a globalized economy, poorly performing state-owned electricity systems were 
increasingly seen as constraining economic growth and undermining international 
competitiveness. Developing countries simply could not continue to absorb the fiscal 
burden of these systems. Around the world, it became evident to policymakers that the 
problems of public electricity systems could be solved only by implementing radical 
structural changes and realigning the roles of the government and the private sector. 
 
  The factors that prompted electricity restructuring and privatization reforms in 
developing countries are not nearly as powerful in the context of South Africa.  Eskom is 
a well-functioning utility even by advanced industrial country standards.  It has managed 
to fulfill its developmental obligations by delivering a highly successful electrification 
programs while at the same time charging some of the lowest tariffs in the world and 
maintaining very good operational and financial performance.  Moreover, Eskom has 
been entirely self-financed through internal reserves and debt raised on the domestic and 
international capital markets without government guarantees.  Thus, unlike many other 
state-owned utilities it has not been draining the state budget nor has it caused the 
diversion of scarce public resources from other social purposes.  Finally, the South   77
The continuing uncertainty 
regarding the status of the 
distribution industry is likely to 
exacerbate the problems of 
inadequate investment in  and 
deterioration of system reliability.  
African economy did not face the macroeconomic instability, external sovereign debt 
problems, and forced adjustments that provided the initial impetus for privatization in the 
developing countries.  
 
  However, even within South Africa’s moderately well-run electricity system 
several problems have emerged which, if not addressed adequately, could pose a serious 
threat to the system’s future viability and sustainability. 
 
…Yet, Continuing Inefficiencies in the Distribution Segment Can Seriously 
Undermine System Security and Reliability 
  
During the past decade, numerous studies [e.g. the analysis of boundaries, 
ownership, asset valuation, regulation, and human resources of the distribution industry 
undertaken by a consortium led by Price WaterhouseCoopers (PwC)] and consultations 
[e.g. the, and the Electricity Distribution Industry Restructuring Committee (EDRIC)] led 
to a growing consensus that the problems in the electricity distribution industry needed 
urgent attention.  High levels of nonpayment for services, insufficient asset management 
strategies and levels of recapitalization, and a lack of appropriate technical resources at 
the municipal level have contributed to an alarming deterioration in the condition of 
distribution assets.  A number of surveys conducted by the NER revealed a growing 
dissatisfaction of customers with their electricity service mainly due to a worsening 
reliability and availability of supply.  There have also been growing complaints about the 
lack proper customer attention on the part of municipal distributors.  
   
One of the key structural deficiencies of the distribution industry has been 
excessive fragmentation—there were too many small, non-viable, poorly-run municipal 
distributors.  After several years of studies and consultations, the Cabinet finally 
approved in June 1999 a plan to merge the large number of municipal distributors and 
Eskom’s distribution businesses into six 
Regional Distribution Companies (REDs).   
However, implementation has been painfully 
slow and convoluted.  The first RED was 
established only in 2005 and only on paper.
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Moreover, recent draft Cabinet memos and 
interventions by National Treasury officials 
have created some uncertainty and confusion 
about the consolidation model that will ultimately be implemented. 
 
The original consolidation plan, if successfully implemented, will correct the past  
failure of small municipal distributors to capture economies of scale, skill and 
specialization; and reduce the substantial differences in the financial status of municipal 
distributors and the wide disparity in the prices paid by geographically segmented 
customer groups.  However, unfavorable microeconomic conditions were not the only 
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The monolithic, vertically-integrated and 
state-owned electricity option is largely a 
strawman from today’s perspective—i.e. 
no one would deliberately choose it for 
the public interest. 
cause of municipal distributors’ problems.  Governance, nonpayment, and the 
municipalities’ traditional dependence on electricity revenue to fund other municipal 
services were also important contributing factors.  The merger and consolidation of 
municipal distributors is unlikely to adequately, if at all, address these governance 
problems.  To the extent that governance problems at the municipal level and the 
performance of local economies were major factors, a more promising direction for 
restructuring and reform would be to remove distribution from direct municipal control.  
 
International experience seems to indicate that an effective way to start and 
sustain revenue collection discipline, pricing and other related reforms critical to the 
viability of electricity distribution is to separate the distribution monopoly from the rest 
of the industry, privatize it, and subject it to price or revenue cap regulation.  A careful 
assessment of the applicability of this experience would clearly require taking into 
account contextual country-specific differences in terms of national priorities and 
development plans, socioeconomic characteristics, historical perspectives that relate to 
the manner in which the electricity sectors evolved and currently operate, and the role of 
institutions and their networks. Still, it is the view of this report that the government’s 
decision to retain the distribution industry under municipal ownership needs to be 
reexamined.     
 
…And Eskom’s Extreme Market Dominance Is Cause for Concern 
  
Historically the electricity industry has had a monolithic structure, with a single 
entity owning generation and transmission capacity and performing all system operations 
and administrative functions.  Due to technological and other fundamental economic 
changes, the conditions that generated this model no longer exist in most countries. 
Indeed, in the last few years, there has been an increasing recognition that the electricity 
industry is not monolithic industries but rather encompasses a number of distinct 
activities with entirely different economic characteristics.  Electricity is a vertical 
industry characterized by transportation 
(a hierarchy of transmission links) and 
distribution networks linking upstream 
production with downstream 
consumption.  These networks entail 
substantial fixed costs that are largely 
sunk because the assets are of minimal 
value for other purposes.  The sunkness 
of transmission and distribution infrastructure mitigates against freedom of entry, 
especially since there are natural monopoly conditions as well due to massive fixed costs. 
  
The cost conditions relating to upstream generation and downstream supply 
activities are less inimical to competition.  Although there are important economies of 
scale and inevitably some sunk costs associated with these activities, they are small in 
relation to those encountered in the transmission and distribution infrastructure. 
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Therefore, there is no question that substantial competition could emerge in many 
activities in the electricity sector if it was properly reorganized.  As a result, governments 
throughout the world have taken substantive steps to restructure and deregulate their 
electricity industries to the fullest extent that is consistent with technological 
opportunities and other elements of efficiency.  The objectives for such restructuring and 
regulatory reform programs have properly included injection of more innovative and 
efficient management, cost-reducing competition and increased efficiency with which the 
sector meets users’ demands, and more responsiveness to the needs of consumers and 
national enterprises. 
  
In view of the sector’s substantial investment requirements, it is imperative that 
the South African authorities reassess their historic policies toward competition and 
market structure in the electricity industry.  Especially because of the tightening 
demand/supply balance and the inadequacy of investment for the maintenance of 
distribution networks (with consequent security and reliability of supply problems) there 
is an urgent need consider rebalancing the roles of the private and public sectors in this 
vital industry of the South African economy.  Private sector participation could have a 
beneficial impact in several areas.  It could: provide superior financial, technical and 
managerial resources; bring greater clarity and transparency to the industry; force the de-
politicization of tariffs; and encourage a procurement environment based on competition 
and cost-effectiveness. 
  
Eskom’s extreme vertical and horizontal market dominance, and especially its 
control of the industry’s bottleneck facilities, is a primary impediment to the future 
competitive developments in the sector.  The integrated utility will have strong incentives 
and ability to make it very difficult for other entities to participate in South Africa’s 
electricity business.  Private entities will simply be reluctant to enter into the electricity 
industry and make substantial sunk investments if the industry’s essential facilities are 
controlled by Eskom—a likely competitor in the downstream provision of electricity 
services to final users. 
 
Eskom’s continued vertical and horizontal market dominance may also inhibit the 
integration of electricity markets in SADC.  The other countries of the region may 
consider Eskom’s large size as posing too serious of a threat to the survival of their 
smaller national utilities.  Thus, integration may be viewed as likely to facilitate Eskom’s 
dominance and monopolization of the region’s electricity markets.  Also, as a vertically-
integrated utility, Eskom will generally have strong incentives for self-dealing and self-
preference (e.g. for its own generating stations) and thus could hinder the interchange of 
power and the extent of cross-border competition that could emerge. 
 
Effective Regulation Is Likely to Prove Challenging  
 
Initially NER faced the typical problems confronting newly established regulatory 
agencies in developing and transition economies that had no prior experience with 
regulation.  These problems included technical capacity and resource constraints; 
accountability and transparency; methodological challenges in areas of substantive 
regulatory determinations, such as the setting of tariffs.  However, NER’s legal mandate   80
was fairly clear and over time it managed to achieve a reasonable degree of autonomy 
and independence, and develop good technical capacity.  Thus, it ultimately became one 
of the most capable independent regulatory institutions in Africa. 
  
The new Electricity Regulation Bill that was introduced into Parliament in August 
2005 could undermine the coherence and independence of the sector’s regulatory 
structure.  Chapter IV of the Bill, if enacted, will take away the statutory authority to 
regulate prices from the National Energy Regulator (NER) and place it in the hands of the 
municipalities which would exercise that authority under the guidance of the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy.  Regulatory responsibilities that must be coherently and delicately 
harmonized should be kept within a single agency and not be counterproductively 
splintered.  The Bill’s proposed demarcation of responsibilities between the Ministry of 
Minerals and Energy, the municipalities, and NER (which would be charged with 
monitoring and regulating the performance and compliance of the municipalities to the 
requirements of the Act), is confusing and will likely undermine regulatory clarity—the 
provisions for NER’s monitoring function are too complex.  Moreover, to ensure 
regulatory stability, an indispensable precondition for attracting private investment, it is 
imperative to mitigate political intrusion on the sector’s tariff policies.  In the face of the 
sector’s substantial requirements for new generating capacity, any rational tariff policy 
will have to be increasingly be based on forward looking economic costs—i.e. the 
reliance on historical book values of generating and other assets which facilitated the low 
prices of the last two decades will inevitably to come to end.  Thus, the realignment of 
prices with underlying long-term costs (that are based on forward looking incremental 
costs and not just historical book values) is rapidly becoming necessary—both for the 
financial viability of the sector and for the public interest.   Effective regulation requires 
independence of the regulators from political influences--the posture of the regulatory 
agency must be one of an impartial, objective, non-political enforcer of policies set forth 
in the controlling statutes, free of transitory political influences.  Thus, the proposed role 
of the Ministry of Minerals and Energy in the regulatory arena will inevitably increase 
regulatory risk, especially as perceived by potential private investors. And the 
combination of regulatory and operational functions on the part of the municipalities will 
clearly conflict with the creation of a “level playing field” in the sector.  Also, some of 
the municipalities might lack the technical expertise to carry out their regulatory 
functions.  Thus the Bill’s proposed statutory framework will lead to capacity problems.  
 
South Africa Must Choose among Imperfect Options 
 
It is the view of this report that there is no universally appropriate model for 
restructuring the electricity sector. And the fact that state ownership is flawed does not 
mean that privatization is appropriate for all countries and all activities within the 
electricity sector. Before state ownership is supplanted by another institutional setup in 
South Africa, it is essential to assess the properties and requirements of the proposed 
alternative—taking into account the sector’s features (its underlying economic attributes 
and the technological conditions of its production) and the country’s economic, 
institutional, social, and political characteristics. 
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In electricity, wholesale competition has worked well in industrial countries 
because of excess capacity, moderate demand growth, and the availability of natural gas 
(which enabled the entry of gas-fired plants at modest scale and relatively low cost). In 
contrast, the South African electricity market is beginning to face a very tight 
demand/supply balance, and periodic blackouts. Thus electricity restructuring and 
privatization are likely to prove more challenging and dependent on administrative 
ability. California’s experience has shown that market liberalization under conditions of 
tight demand (reserve margins below 10 percent) can lead to high and volatile prices that 
would be politically unacceptable and would likely derail attempts at radical reform. 
Unbundling introduces price risks between generators and suppliers that require contracts 
and hedging instruments to guard against unanticipated events that dramatically affect 
spot prices. And in interconnected systems operating under a variety of jurisdictions, 
spare capacity is a public good that may not be adequately supplied unless pricing 
policies are put in place to ensure its adequate remuneration. 
   
  Given the unique economic characteristics of the electricity industry—especially 
the need for coordination between generation and transmission, and the difficulty of 
replicating vertical relationships with market mechanisms—Eskom’s vertically integrated 
structure has some appeal. In theory the integrated company could minimize the cost of 
meeting demand at each point in time through optimal dispatch of its power stations, 
taking into account system-wide transmission constraints and losses. In the long run it 
could exploit the investment relationships between generation and transmission and 
undertake investments based on system-wide planning. 
 
But these benefits will likely be small relative to those that come from promoting 
competition in generation: lower construction and operating costs, incentives to close 
inefficient plants, and better pricing.  Recent technological advances have dramatically 
altered the cost structure of electricity generation that ultimately rendered this segment of 
the industry structurally competitive or contestable.  Moreover, the size of the electricity 
market in South Africa is sufficiently large to permit many generation companies to 
function, and to provide both active and potential competition to each other. 
 